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Overview 
 
Volume 1 of this thesis is presented in three parts.  Part 1 is a systematic review of 
experimental or quasi-experimental studies that investigate the impact of the 
strategic adoption of vantage perspective on affect.  Vantage perspective describes 
either adopting a first- or third-person perspective, either in mental imagery or 
verbal modalities.  Part 2 describes a study exploring the impact of two mental 
imagery craving regulation strategies in cigarette smokers on craving, affect and 
smoking behaviour. One strategy is based on “defusion,” a technique used within 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, and the other is based on the use of imagery 
replacement, a cognitive psychology approach. Smoking behaviour is measured 
explicitly through latency to smoke and number of cigarettes smoked, and implicitly 
through the use of a stimulus-response task measuring approach and avoidance 
behaviour. Part 3 is a critical appraisal of three elements of the empirical paper, 
designing the mental imagery craving regulation strategies, the limitations of the 
study design, and the difficulties of the recruitment process and the subsequent 
impact on the empirical study.  
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Abstract 
 
Aims 
Adopting a distanced third-person perspective is a cognitive reappraisal strategy 
argued to be effective in emotion regulation. However, studies of psychological 
disorders suggest spontaneous adoption of a third-person perspective may be a 
counter-productive avoidance strategy.   This review aimed to identify studies 
that investigate the deliberate adoption of a third- or first-person vantage 
perspective and its impact on affect. 
 
Method 
A systematic review was conducted across four databases. After exclusion 
criteria were applied, 40 studies were identified that investigated the impact of 
vantage perspective, in both imagery and verbal modalities, on self-reported 
affect, in both clinical and non-clinical samples.   
 
Results 
Studies are organized for the purposes of this review into categories of low 
mood, anxiety, anger, self-conscious emotions such as guilt, positive and 
negative autobiographical memories, and positive emotions.  Use of the third-
person perspective was mainly found to be associated with a reduction in both 
positive and negative affect and affect intensity across these domains.  However, 
a number of studies included measures of semantic change, which appeared to be 
a key mediator in reduction of affect across a variety of indices.   
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Conclusions 
This review found that strategically adopting a third-person perspective is linked 
to lower affect intensity regardless of valence.  It also indicates that a third-
person perspective has the potential to introduce new information that regulates 
emotion.  The subsequent change in meaning may thus differentiate it from an 
avoidance strategy.   
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1. Introduction 
Effective emotion regulation is an essential ability for managing emotions of 
varying valence and strength (Gross, 1998b; Koole, 2009). Emotion regulation 
strategies can be automatically deployed, or may be strategic and require effort.  
Under- or over-use of certain emotion regulation strategies can be associated 
with a broad range of psychological difficulties (Berking & Wupperman, 2012; 
Kring & Werner, 2004).  Ochsner and Gross (2005) argue that emotion 
regulation strategies can be broadly categorised as behavioural and cognitive. 
Behavioural strategies are intended to reduce the expression of emotion and tend 
not to modulate the felt intensity of emotional experiences. By contrast, cognitive 
emotion regulation strategies can act as contextual modulators, either altering the 
situation or context within which emotional cues and resulting affect are 
experienced (antecedent strategies), or used after the onset of an emotional 
response (response-focused strategies) (Gross, 1998a).   
 
1.1. Reappraisal 
Reappraisal is a response-focused cognitive regulation strategy.  Ochsner and 
Gross (2008) note that reappraisal is typically operationalised in studies in one of 
two ways. Information can be reinterpreted, i.e. a new meaning is ascribed to a 
situation, usually through verbal means, that alters its affective impact or 
valence.  Research suggests that lower spontaneous use of this type of 
reappraisal, or lower ability to use reappraisal strategies in response to aversive 
experiences, is linked to both acute and enduring psychological difficulties (e.g. 
T. S. Davis et al., 2014; Garnefski et al., 2002; O'Driscoll, Laing, & Mason, 
2014). 
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Alternatively, a third-person, detached perspective can be used to distance 
the self from the stimuli, thereby achieving the same goal of altering the affective 
impact (Ochsner & Gross, 2008). In this context, 'perspective' refers to the visual 
vantage point adopted, but can also include verbal distancing strategies.   In these 
reappraisal strategies, the perspective adopted by the individual on their 
experience permits the introduction of new and/or regulatory information. 
Nonetheless, the extent to which this is an effective strategy regardless of type of 
emotion or clinical difficulty is not clear.  Thus, this review aims to 
systematically evaluate experimental studies that examine the impact of the 
adoption of a third- or first-person perspective on affect, in both non-clinical and 
clinical populations. 
 
1.2. Vantage perspective in memories 
As noted above, one method of operationalising perspective has been to 
consider the visual ‘vantage point.’  This refers primarily to a third-person or a 
first-person perspective (Nigro & Neisser, 1983). Third-person perspectives are 
those experienced as if from the perspective of an observer (i.e. are allocentric), 
and first-person perspectives are those experienced as if through one’s own eyes 
(i.e. egocentric).  People may habitually experience one perspective 
predominantly during autobiographical memory recall, or a mixture of both 
perspectives (Rice & Rubin, 2009).  
First-person perspective memories seem to have a stronger relationship with 
affect (Nigro & Neisser, 1983), and this relationship is true for both positive and 
negative memories, compared with neutral events (D'Argembeau, Comblain, & 
Van Der Linden, 2003). First-person memories are linked to greater amounts of 
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reported emotion at the time of the event, and to current intensity at recall 
(Siedlecki, 2015). McIsaac and Eich (2002) found that accounts of first-person 
perspective episodic memories contained more detail about affective reactions, in 
addition to more sensory information and references to psychological states.  By 
contrast, third-person memories were linked to more detached qualities such as 
location and visual information. 
 
1.3. Mental imagery and verbal processing 
The studies reported above concentrate on memories experienced primarily 
as visual mental images.  Mental imagery can be described as the experience of, 
for example, ‘seeing with the mind’s eye’ (Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001), 
and mental imagery manipulations have been shown to have a greater effect on 
emotion, compared to use of verbal strategies (Holmes & Mathews, 2005; Pictet 
& Holmes, 2013).   Mental imagery has been argued to have strong links with 
clinical disorders (Hagenaars & Holmes, 2012; Holmes, Iyadurai, Jacob, & 
Hales, 2015).  Thus, further understanding perspective within mental imagery, 
and its impact, is a key objective in clinical psychology.   
However, verbal modalities have also been shown to be important in clinical 
approaches, for example, ‘self-talk’ (e.g. in eating disorders,  Scott, Hanstock, & 
Thornton, 2014) and the therapeutic use of written forms of expression 
(Pennebaker & Evans, 2014). The language used mirrors the visual vantage 
perspective, from the first-person pronoun, “I,” to third-person pronouns, e.g. 
“she/he.”  Further, research is suggestive of a link between reduced use of first-
person pronouns in diary writing and an increase in a more distanced style of 
processing events (Cohn, Mehl, & Pennebaker, 2004) which connects 
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conceptually to the use of the third-person visual perspective.  Thus both mental 
imagery and verbal (i.e. word-based) modalities could both be important targets 
for intervention. 
 
1.4. Vantage perspective and symptoms of psychological disorder 
A number of studies have explored the phenomenology of the visual vantage 
perspective adopted, both during spontaneous autobiographical recall and 
instructed recall, in the context of various psychological disorders.  These studies 
have employed a variety of methodologies, from correlational designs to 
experimental or quasi-experimental studies.  Many studies investigate 
perspective as a dependent variable, i.e. following instructed recall, or as 
correlated with other dependent variables such as self-reported affect.   
Several studies have shown that adults and adolescents with social phobia 
tend to experience images of themselves in a social situation from a third-person 
perspective (D'Argembeau, Van der Linden, d'Acremont, & Mayers, 2006; 
Hackmann, Clark, & McManus, 2000; Hackmann, Surawy, & Clark, 1998; 
Schreiber & Steil, 2013; Wells, Clark, & Ahmad, 1998).  Indeed, a distorted 
third-person self image is argued to be a key maintaining factor within the 
cognitive model of social phobia (Clark & Wells, 1995).  Higher degrees of 
anxiety appear to be linked to increased third-person perspective in social phobia 
(Coles, Turk, Heimberg, & Fresco, 2001) and one study also demonstrated an 
increase in third-person perspective in social phobic memories over time (Coles, 
Turk, & Heimberg, 2002).  
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Other anxiety disorders share a similar pattern of increased third-person 
perspective, for example, in agoraphobia (Day, Holmes, & Hackmann, 2004; 
Wells & Papageorgiou, 1999) and body-dysmorphic disorder (Osman, Cooper, 
Hackmann, & Veale, 2004). The literature for obsessive-compulsive disorder is 
more mixed.  One study showed that obsessive-compulsive traits correlate 
positively with frequency of third-person memories, which were, however, rated 
as more emotional than first-person memories (Terry & Barwick, 1998).  
However, this is contrasted by subsequent research; a later study found that 
compared to other anxiety disorders, people with OCD reported more first-
person memories (Lipton, Brewin, Linke, & Halperin, 2010), and another that 
people with OCD experienced more first-person images of dirt and 
contamination compared to a non-clinical control group (Coughtrey, Shafran, & 
Rachman, 2013).  This may link to the hypothesized inflated sense of personal 
responsibility in OCD (Salkovskis, Shafran, Rachman, & Freeston, 1999). 
The presence of post-traumatic symptoms is linked to increased third-person 
perspective in recall of trauma memories (Berntsen, Willert, & Rubin, 2003).  In 
contrast to OCD and social phobia, trauma memories recalled from this 
perspective are reported to be less emotional and anxiety provoking (McIsaac & 
Eich, 2004).   However, research has linked higher levels of avoidance to an 
increased incidence of third-person perspective in trauma memories (Kenny & 
Bryant, 2007), suggesting that this may be functioning as an avoidance strategy, 
rather than an adaptive emotional regulation strategy.  Indeed, increased recall 
from a third-person perspective predicts severity of PTSD symptoms both at the 
time of the trauma and one year later (Kenny et al., 2009).  A shift from an initial 
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first-person perspective to a third-person perspective at twelve months was also 
associated with higher levels of PTSD symptoms.   
 
 Studies on depression have not produced a consistent picture when 
examining the relationship between symptoms and perspective.  Some studies 
show increased third-person perspective in negative memories (Kuyken & 
Howell, 2006; Kuyken & Moulds, 2009; Williams & Moulds, 2007), linked to 
higher use of avoidant strategies such as emotional detachment and rumination as 
measured by self-report questionnaires (Kuyken & Moulds, 2009; Williams & 
Moulds, 2007).  However, this link between depressive memories and third-
person perspective was not replicated in another study (Lemogne et al., 2006).  
Low mood also appears to be linked with fewer first-person positive memories 
(Bergouignan et al., 2008; Lemogne et al., 2006; Nelis, Debeer, Holmes, & Raes, 
2013).  Similarly, in another study, although first-person perspective negative 
memories were linked to increased distress, it was only with positive memories 
that the third-person perspective was linked to experiential avoidance (Moulds, 
Williams, Grisham, & Nickerson, 2012).  
 Finally, although the literature describing this relationship between 
perspective and affect in other disorders is limited, there are similarly studies to 
suggest that third-person perspective plays a role, for example in schizophrenia 
(Potheegadoo, Berna, Cuervo-Lombard, & Danion, 2013). 
The prevalence of the third-person perspective across so many psychological 
disorders suggests that this is being adopted as a maladaptive emotion regulation 
strategy rather than a reappraisal strategy (see e.g. Williams & Moulds, 2007).  
This is supported by research within a general population sample in which higher 
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levels of dissociation were associated with a tendency to retrieve memories from 
a third person perspective (Sutin & Robins, 2010).  Thus, spontaneous adoption 
of the third-person perspective in psychological difficulties appears to function to 
avoid pain associated with affect.  In addition, people with chronic pain who 
report pain memories from a third-person perspective also report lower pain 
severity (McNamara, Benson, McGeeney, Brown, & Albert, 2005), indicating 
that the third-person perspective is effective as a strategy to avoid physical pain. 
 
1.5. The effect of perspective on affect 
As noted earlier, emotion regulation strategies such as reappraisal can be 
employed automatically (unconsciously) or deliberately (through conscious 
effort).  The studies described above describe reports of spontaneously adopted 
perspectives and the link with affect.  However, these designs do not allow for 
inferences of causality or provide information about the direction of the effect 
(i.e. whether vantage point influences affect, or vice versa).   Thus, while the link 
between perspective and affect is suggestive of potential future clinical directions 
in terms of changing perspective, it does not offer information about the ability 
to adopt either perspective (e.g. whether participants are instructed to adopt a 
perspective or to change from the perspective spontaneously adopted at recall) or 
the impact of doing so on affect.  Nor do these studies offer insight into whether 
the third-person perspective is used as an avoidance or reappraisal strategy, or 
what might differentiate these two strategies.  Therefore this review aims to 
investigate the effect of the deliberate use of perspective (change) on affect.  As 
such, the review concentrates on studies that allow inferences of causality, and 
therefore suggest potential clinical interventions. 
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The review addresses the question as to the potential effect of deliberately 
adopting a certain perspective as an emotion regulation strategy in either mental 
imagery or verbal modalities.  It should be noted that the literature is somewhat 
hampered by the multiplicity of terms used to describe the same underlying 
concept (perspective or perspective change).  Studies may refer to, for example, 
“first/third-person” perspective, “field” or “participant/observer” perspective or 
“distanced”/“immersed” perspectives.  Here, the terms first- and third-person 
perspective will be adopted throughout for consistency. In summary, this review 
of the literature aims to investigate the associations between vantage perspective, 
within both verbal and imagery based modalities, and affective experience.    
 
2. Method 
A systematic review of the literature was conducted using four databases, 
PsychInfo, Embase, Medline and Web of Science.  The time-frame was limited 
from 1980 to 2014.  The search was conducted on 7th Oct 2014 using terms 
relating to perspective, affective descriptors and either mental imagery or verbal 
strategies.  For a full list, please see Appendix 1. 
Inclusion criteria for the review were (i) peer-reviewed journal articles, (ii) 
published in English, (iii) relating to adults, (iv) empirical studies in which (v) 
participants were assigned one of two internal vantage perspectives (first- or 
third-person; independent variable) using a randomized or quasi-experimental 
design and had (vi) at least one affect-related outcome measure (dependent 
variable).  Here, an internal vantage perspective was defined in contrast to a 
change in understanding another’s perspective (in e.g Theory of Mind). 
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The initial search produced 2664 articles, and 1469 duplicates were removed, 
leaving 1195 articles.  After a review of titles, 95 articles remained. An abstract 
and full article text search was conducted, and 39 studies from 30 articles were 
identified for review. References lists were also searched; one additional article 
was identified.  Thus 31 articles were included in the review, reporting 40 studies 
(see Figure 1). 
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3. Results 
The 40 studies identified in the search were, for the purposes of this review, 
organized into six broad categories; low mood, anxiety, anger, self-conscious 
emotions, positive and negative autobiographical memories and positive 
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emotions in clinical and healthy populations.  All studies are reviewed in detail 
in Table 1. 
 
3.1. Sadness/low mood 
Seven studies were identified which either examined the effect of perspective 
on recalled sad or depressive experiences and/or included dysphoric/depressed 
populations (Grisham, Flower, Williams, & Moulds, 2011; Kross & Ayduk, 
2008, 2009; Kross, Gard, Deldin, Clifton, & Ayduk, 2012; Williams & Moulds, 
2008; Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011). 
 
3.1.1. Sample characteristics in sadness/low mood studies 
 
3.1.1.1. Instructed recall of depressive experience in non-clinical 
samples 
Non-clinical student samples were used in three studies, two examining 
memories of “depressive experiences” (Kross & Ayduk, 2008) and one 
investigating “sad” memories (Grisham et al., 2011).  The Kross and Ayduk 
(2008) study also included unreported Beck Depression Inventory – II data (BDI-
II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), analysed in a subsequent study reviewed below 
(Kross & Ayduk, 2009).   
 
3.1.1.2. Instructed recall of depressive experience in subclinical 
and clinical samples 
Four studies reported participant depression levels (Kross & Ayduk, 
2009; Kross et al., 2012; Williams & Moulds, 2008; Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
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2011), using a clinically relevant measure to establish levels of depression 
symptomatology, the BDI-II (Beck et al., 1996).  Two studies examined negative 
memories in subclinical dysphoric samples (Williams & Moulds, 2008; Wisco & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011).  One study (Kross et al., 2012) investigated memories 
of a “depressing life experience” in clinically depressed and control samples, 
using a validated diagnostic scale to identify depression, i.e. the Structured 
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID-IV; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 
2002).  One study investigated the effect of levels of depressive 
symptomatology, pooling standardised data from five previous studies examining 
“depressive” and “angry” memories in which BDI-II data had been collected 
(Kross & Ayduk, 2009). 
 
3.1.2. Nature of perspective manipulation 
Most studies (Kross & Ayduk, 2008, 2009; Kross et al., 2012; Williams 
& Moulds, 2008; Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011) contained detailed, clear 
descriptions of the perspectives to be adopted in their instructions (for more 
details, see Table 1).  For example, explanations were given of how participants 
might experience these perspectives, e.g. “you can […] see yourself in the event” 
(third-person perspective) and “see the experience unfold through your own 
eyes” (first-person perspective).  The instructions in Grisham et al’s study (2011) 
only implicitly involve the first-person perspective i.e. “ focus on [the negative 
event] from your own perspective” and the instructions for the third-person 
include an instruction to consider positive aspects, e.g. “lessons you have learnt” 
(Grisham et al., 2011, p. 279).  Only four studies report a perspective-
manipulation check, i.e. whether the participants adopted the required 
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perspective (Grisham et al., 2011; Kross et al., 2012; Williams & Moulds, 2008; 
Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011).   
 
3.1.3. Affect outcomes 
Most studies demonstrated a link between the adoption of the third-
person perspective and a reduction in negative affect or affect intensity, although 
the reduction in negative affect was not universal, and was not seen in an 
interpretation bias task (Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011).  It is unclear whether 
deliberately adopting the third-person perspective has a more potent effect, 
compared to the first-person, in reducing, or buffering against a rise in negative 
affect or affect intensity principally when clinically significant levels of 
depression or dysphoria are present (Kross & Ayduk, 2009; Kross et al., 2012; 
Williams & Moulds, 2008) or regardless of depression (Grisham et al., 2011; 
Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011).  Anxiety was also reduced in people with 
mild dysphoria, when an initially recalled first-person perspective memory was 
re-recalled from the third-person perspective, and vice versa  
(Williams & Moulds, 2008).  
 
3.1.4. Methodological limitations  
The lack of reported manipulation check in Kross et al’s studies (Kross & 
Ayduk, 2008, 2009) is a limitation.  Further, Kross and Ayduk (2008) did not 
report participant levels of depression prior to the manipulation or the level of 
negative affect associated with recall of the depressive experience.  Thus, 
potential baseline group differences may have affected the results reported in 
Study 1.  However, the initial results were replicated and extended in Study 2, 
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which used a different sample and further, measured affect at two time-points, 
mitigating these concerns.   
 
3.1.5. Additional reappraisal-related measures 
Kross and colleagues consistently included measures of semantic change (i.e. 
a change in meaning) in their studies, e.g. blind ratings of stream of thought 
essays for “recounting” information and “reconstruing” experience (Kross & 
Ayduk, 2008, 2009) or Likert scales measuring the same constructs (Kross et al., 
2012).  Greater reconstrual, as operationalised by a change in understanding for 
example, was found to be associated with the third-person perspective in all 
studies, and was found to partially mediate the effect of perspective on levels of 
affect (Kross & Ayduk, 2008) and emotional reactivity (Kross & Ayduk, 2009).  
 
3.2. Anxiety/threat 
Seven studies relating to anxiety or threatening situations (i.e. threats from 
social rejection or relational conflict) were identified (Kross et al., 2014; Lau, 
Moulds, & Richardson, 2009; Seih, Lin, Huang, Peng, & Huang, 2008; Wang, 
Lin, Huang, & Yeh, 2012).  
 
3.2.1. Sample characteristics in anxiety/threat studies 
 
3.2.1.1. Induction of anxiety in non-clinical samples 
Five studies reported using anxiety- or threat-inducing experimental 
paradigms within undergraduate/community samples (Kross et al., 2014; Lau et 
al., 2009; Wang et al., 2012).  One of these (Lau et al., 2009) used an ostracism 
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paradigm to induce social threat (rejection), and three studies by Kross and 
colleagues (2014) used different social anxiety-provoking tasks, i.e. social 
evaluation (Study 2) and social stress induction (Studies 1 and 3). Wang and 
colleagues (2012) recruited an internet community sample using the Experiences 
in Close Relationships Scale to measure anxious and avoidant styles of 
attachment (ECR; Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998) and used a relationship-
conflict scenario to induce threat. 
 
3.2.1.2. Anxiety experiences in subclinical samples 
One study induced anxiety experimentally in a clinically relevant 
analogue sample (Spurr & Stopa, 2003). Spurr and Stopa (2003) divided 
participants into high and low scorers based on responses to the Fear of Negative 
Evaluation Scale (FNES; Watson & Friend, 1969). One study divided 
participants into high, moderate and low anxiety groups, and investigated the 
effect of diary writing on anxiety levels (Seih et al., 2008). 
 
3.2.2. Nature of perspective manipulation 
All studies specified the instructions on the perspective to be adopted by 
participants (see Table 1 for more details).  Two studies reported clear and 
detailed instructions of how first- or third-person perspectives were induced, 
either through the use of mental imagery instructions (Lau et al., 2009), or a 
written task (Wang et al., 2012). Three studies using verbal self-talk also provide 
clear and detailed instructions on how to adopt a first- or a third- (“non-first”) 
person perspective; the latter refers to instructions to use both second- and third-
person pronouns (e.g. “you” and “[name]”/”he/she”) (Kross et al., 2014). Seih 
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and colleagues (2008) required participants to write using first/second/third-
person pronouns.  Finally, although they describe the two perspective conditions 
as “observer” (third-person) and “field” (first-person), only the third-person 
instructions in Spurr and Stopa’s (2003) study explicitly correspond to 
instructions used in the other studies reported in this review.  The instructions for 
the first-person condition more closely resemble those required to achieve an 
'external focus of attention’ in which clients are asked to bring awareness to 
external rather than internal stimuli, a procedure used in the cognitive 
behavioural treatment of social anxiety (e.g. Wells & Papageorgiou, 1998).  Five 
studies report manipulation checks (Kross et al., 2014; Lau et al., 2009; Spurr & 
Stopa, 2003). 
 
3.2.3. Affect outcomes  
Reductions in anxiety and negative emotions resulting from third-person 
perspective (compared to the first-person) instructions were only seen in those 
studies using a verbal or written intervention (Kross et al., 2014; Wang et al., 
2012) and in one study (also using a written intervention), only with a high 
anxious group (Seih et al., 2008).  Use of the third-person perspective did not 
reduce anxiety in a highly socially anxious group, but notably also did not 
increase anxiety, potentially because the high anxiety group would typically 
already be using this perspective to evaluate themselves (Spurr & Stopa, 2003).  
The effect of social evaluation appears to be linked to the third-person 
perspective in an ostracism paradigm (social inclusion/exclusion). For 
“excluded” participants, the third-person perspective increased perception of 
threat  over time (Lau et al., 2009), suggesting that the first-person perspective 
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performed a regulatory function.  No differences were found for the “included” 
participants. 
When attachment styles were considered (Wang et al., 2012), a third-
person perspective reduced negative affect in those with low, but not high scores 
on a measure of avoidant attachment.  Both groups showed lower levels of 
negative affect when writing in a third-person perspective.  
 
3.2.4. Methodological limitations 
Wang and colleagues’ study is the only one indentified in this review to 
consider the interaction between attachment styles and perspective use (Wang et 
al., 2012).  As part of their rationale, the authors hypothesized that higher 
avoidant attachment should be associated with a typical strategic or automatic 
adoption of the third-person perspective, and that those with higher anxious 
attachment should typically have a first-person perspective.  The study would 
have benefitted from a measure of the perspective typically adopted when 
considering conflict to help further explain the results.   
Although Seih and colleagues’s (2008) study has the advantage of 
measuring the effect of perspective use on affect over time, it also has several 
methodological limitations that make interpretation of results difficult.  Firstly, 
the order of perspective taking is not counter-balanced.  Additionally, their 
protocol involved repeated writing about an emotionally charged event. Since 
repeated writing about the event may have independently changed emotional 
ratings, the absence of a control for this makes it difficult to attribute change 
primarily to perspective.  Secondly, the second rating of affect occurs a full week 
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after the completion of the diary; thus confounding variables may have been 
introduced during that week which could explain the difference in anxiety levels.   
Thirdly, Seih and colleagues do not provide an explanation for cut-offs 
used to divide the groups into high, moderate and low levels of anxiety.  Further, 
the measure used (Fisher, 2000) is not clinically validated or relevant to anxiety 
assessment; indeed there is no reference to anxiety in Fisher’s (2000) paper.  It is 
therefore unclear how anxiety was measured in Seih et al’s study. They also do 
not report results for measurements of positive emotion and sadness.   It should 
be noted that a number of these points were subsequently addressed in a further 
study by Seih and colleagues (reviewed below, Seih, Chung, & Pennebaker, 
2011).  However, in common with a number of related studies, neither this study, 
nor that by Wang and colleagues (2012) reported manipulation checks, i.e. 
whether participants had adopted the assigned perspective. 
Although Spurr and Stopa (2003) used a number of validated measures of 
anxiety in their study, the study design may have compromised the extent to 
which participants were able to use the third-person perspective. The study was 
designed so that participants used the perspective manipulation while performing 
a secondary speech-task.  As participants will have been also thinking of what to 
say, this additional cognitive load may have affected the third-person condition.  
The ‘first-person’ condition involved a relatively simple external focus 
condition, e.g. “try as much as possible to be aware of the environment rather 
than of yourself,” (p.1017) which likely entailed less cognitive load.  Further, it 
may have been more effective to have an anticipatory perspective manipulation, 
and to investigate the effect of perspective on memories of the speech once the 
task was completed.   
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Although many of the studies addressed anxiety-provoking situations, the 
emotional measures used did not consistently measure this. Lau and colleagues 
(2009) used the Primary Needs Questionnaire (Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 
2004) as a proxy measure of negative affective impact.  Although it does not 
measure a particular emotion, it addresses constructs of self-esteem and 
meaningful existence, which connect to affective experience.  Nonetheless, the 
study could have usefully included a state anxiety measure for example.   
 
3.2.5. Additional reappraisal-related measures 
As in previous studies, Kross and colleagues (2014) included measures of 
semantic processing; either post-event “recounting” or “reconstruing” (Study 3) 
or challenge and threat appraisals (Study 4).  The third-person perspective was 
associated with more reconstruing, greater perceived challenge and lower threat, 
indicating that the use of this perspective encouraged a shift in understanding or 
appraisal of the situation.   
 
3.3. Anger  
Six studies relating to anger experiences were identified (Ayduk & Kross, 
2008; Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005; Mischkowski, Kross, & Bushman, 2012; 
Ray, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2008; Wimalaweera & Moulds, 2008). 
 
3.3.1. Sample characteristics in anger studies 
 
3.3.1.1. Recall of anger experience/induction of anger in non-
clinical samples 
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Five studies asked participants to recall an experience of feeling anger 
(Ayduk & Kross, 2008; Kross et al., 2005; Ray et al., 2008; Wimalaweera & 
Moulds, 2008). One study (Mischkowski et al., 2012) induced anger 
experimentally using a provocation task (Bushman, Bonacci, Pedersen, Vasquez, 
& Miller, 2005). 
 
3.3.2. Nature of perspective manipulations 
All studies specified the perspective to be adopted. Clear and detailed 
instructions regarding perspective were described in all studies, although only 
three studies reported a manipulation check (Mischkowski et al., 2012; Ray et 
al., 2008; Wimalaweera & Moulds, 2008). Two studies differentiated between a 
“what” and “why” analysis, i.e. either focusing on feelings or the reasons behind 
the feelings, from both first- and third-person perspectives (Kross et al., 2005, 
Study 1; Wimalaweera & Moulds, 2008).  Two studies had an exclusively “why” 
focus from both perspectives (Ayduk & Kross, 2008; Kross et al., 2005, Study 
2). 
In Ray and colleagues’ study, the first-person instructions asked 
participants to “think about [the “angering event”] from your own perspective” 
(Ray et al., 2008, p. 135). The third-person (“alternative”) perspective includes a 
suggestion to think about the event using a different perspective, “for example, 
you might try to see this event from the perspective of an impartial observer” 
(Ray et al., 2008, p. 135).  
 
3.3.3. Affect outcomes  
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The third-person perspective was associated with lower levels of anger, 
emotional reactivity and negative affect in most studies, particularly when a 
“why” focus was adopted (Ayduk & Kross, 2008; Kross et al., 2005; 
Mischkowski et al., 2012; Ray et al., 2008). One study (Wimalaweera & Moulds, 
2008), however, failed to replicate the initial studies by Kross and colleagues, 
finding instead that the third-person “why” condition increased anger post-task, 
and anger/negative affect and intrusions 24 hours later.   
 
3.3.4. Methodological limitations 
Kross and colleagues (2005) did not measure state levels of 
anger/negative affect between groups at baseline, or of the memories themselves, 
something noted by Wimalaweera and Moulds (2008) who included this in their 
replication study.  However, this latter study, which did not replicate Kross et 
al’s (2005) results, may have been insufficiently powered (n=14-16 per 
condition) to detect a medium effect (Ayduk & Kross, 2009).  
The third-person perspective instruction in Ray and colleagues’ study 
(2008) included an example of taking an observer’s perspective, but nonetheless 
participants may have found an alternative way to think about their experience 
from a different perspective (e.g. temporally). Further, the first-person 
instructions are not explicitly a first-person visual perspective (e.g. “through your 
own eyes”). Thus in this condition participants could have experienced third-
person perspective imagery congruent with what they felt to be their own 
perspective.  It is possible that clearer and more specific instructions (including 
detailed examples) may have resulted in a more consistent adopting of the 
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required perspective, although manipulation checks suggest that participants 
complied with their assigned perspective. 
Perspective manipulation checks were not reported by Kross and 
colleagues (Ayduk & Kross, 2008; Kross et al., 2005) which means the 
possibility that participants did not adopt the assigned perspective cannot be 
excluded. 
 
3.3.5. Additional reappraisal-related measures 
In their second study, Kross and colleagues (2005) also measured concrete 
and abstract construals of the situation.  They found that lower levels of concrete 
(relative to abstract) understanding mediated the effect of the third-person “why” 
analysis, i.e. that relatively greater abstract processing was a key element in 
affect reduction.  
 
3.4. Self-conscious emotion studies 
Seven studies related to self-conscious emotions were identified (Hung & 
Mukhopadhyay, 2012; Katzir & Eyal, 2013; Libby & Eibach, 2011).  Self-
conscious emotions, e.g. guilt and shame, can be defined as those involving self-
reflection and self-evaluation (Tracy & Robins, 2007). Self-conscious emotions 
are linked to inferences about how (internalized) others may perceive and 
evaluate the self (Leary, 2007).  For example, guilt has been linked to 
behavioural transgressions, whereas shame has been linked to actions which 
appear to reflect negatively on a person’s character (Tangney & Dearing, 2003).  
This is in contrast to global negative evaluations that may be feared in anxiety or 
low mood. 
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3.4.1. Sample characteristics in self-conscious emotion studies 
 
3.4.1.1. Induction or recall of self-conscious emotion in non-
clinical samples 
Two studies asked participants to imagine scenarios in which they might 
be expected to feel self-conscious emotions (e.g. embarrassment) (Hung & 
Mukhopadhyay, 2012, Studies 1 and 3) and one study examined recall of 
memories of resisting or succumbing to temptation, both potentially socially-
evaluative situations (Hung & Mukhopadhyay, 2012, Study 2).  Two studies 
(Katzir & Eyal, 2013) compared memories of self-conscious emotions 
(shame/guilt) to basic emotions (sadness/anger). 
 
3.4.1.2. Induction of self-conscious emotions in subclinical 
samples 
Two studies investigated the relationship between imagined failure 
experiences, shame, and perspective in participants with high and low self-
esteem (Libby, Valenti, Pfent, & Eibach, 2011) measured using the Rosenberg 
Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965).  Although not a direct measure of clinical 
difficulty, low self-esteem is linked to many mental health problems (e.g. Mann, 
Hosman, Schaalma, & de Vries, 2004). 
 
3.4.2. Nature of perspective manipulations 
All studies specified the perspective to be adopted.  Third- and first-
person instructions were clear and detailed in all studies, and five studies 
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reported a manipulation check (Hung & Mukhopadhyay, 2012; Libby et al., 
2011).   
 
3.4.3. Affect outcomes  
No clear picture emerges relating to self-conscious emotions. Using a 
third-person perspective increases positive self-conscious emotions (e.g. pride) 
when “resisting temptation”, and negative self-conscious emotions (e.g. guilt) 
when “succumbing to temptation” (Hung & Mukhopadhyay, 2012, Studies 1 and 
2).  This pattern was replicated in an imaginary scenario linked to both 
excitement and embarrassment (Hung & Mukhopadhyay, 2012, Study 3); thus a 
third-person perspective increased embarrassment. This would appear to link to 
the importance of the external observer’s perspective in situations of evaluation 
of the self; when adopting this perspective, participants experienced either 
increased pride (when they could have been positively evaluated) or guilt (when 
they could have been negatively evaluated).   
However, in two studies (Katzir & Eyal, 2013), use of the third-person 
perspective was not shown to have an effect on self-conscious emotions, namely 
guilt and shame, although these studies replicated previous work on anger (Kross 
et al., 2005) and sadness (Kross & Ayduk, 2008).  Self-esteem appears to have a 
mediating effect on the impact of the third-person perspective in shame in failure 
memories (Libby et al., 2011), a construct not measured by Katzir and Eyal, 
which could explain their null finding. 
 
3.4.4. Methodological limitations 
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The emotion outcome measures analysed by Hung and Mukhopadhyay 
(2012) do not investigate the difference between “guilt” and “shame,” which are 
separate self-conscious emotions (Tangney & Dearing, 2003).  In all three 
studies they only include a measure of “guilt.”  It is possible that inclusion of a 
measure of shame would have further clarified the impact of perspective change.  
Finally, the sample sizes reported in Hung and Mukhopadhyay’s Studies 2 and 3 
may be too small (approx. n =18/13 respectively) to detect an effect in all of the 
emotional constructs measured (e.g. embarrassment).  There was no reported 
manipulation check in Katzir and Eyal’s (2013) study.  
 
3.4.5. Additional reappraisal-related measures 
In their second and third studies, Hung and Mukopadhyay (2012) also 
included measures of appraisals of the autobiographical memories; those using a 
third-person perspective were more likely to think of how others might evaluate 
them than the enjoyable aspects of the experience.  This was found to mediate 
the effect of perspective on affect in both studies.  
Katzir and Eyal (2013) also included a written task of the anger/guilt, and 
sadness/shame memory which was independently coded for self-evaluations.  
Although they found that self-evaluations were higher in the self-conscious 
emotion condition compared to the ‘basic’ emotion condition, there was no effect 
of perspective, suggesting that these appraisals did not mediate the effect of the 
third-person perspective. 
 
3.5. Studies on negative and positive autobiographical and episodic 
memory in non-clinical samples 
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Ten studies were identified relating to autobiographical/episodic memory 
(Bagri & Jones, 2009; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Crawley, 2010; Robinson & 
Swanson, 1993; Seih et al., 2011; Sekiguchi & Nonaka, 2014; Sutin & Robins, 
2010; Terry & Horton, 2007). 
 
3.5.1. Sample characteristics in positive and negative autobiographical 
and episodic memory studies 
 
3.5.1.1. Recall of autobiographical memories in non-clinical 
samples 
Eight studies addressed autobiographical memories.  Four studies 
investigated negative autobiographical memories (Crawley, 2010; Seih et al., 
2011; Terry & Horton, 2007).  Two studies investigated both negative and 
positive autobiographical memories (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Sekiguchi & 
Nonaka, 2014). One study investigated autobiographical memories without pre-
specifying valence to participants (Robinson & Swanson, 1993).  One study was 
identified which related to “self-defining” autobiographical memories (Sutin & 
Robins, 2010). 
 
3.5.1.2. Recall of episodic memories in non-clinical samples 
Two studies were identified which investigated recall of experimentally 
presented material (Bagri & Jones, 2009). 
 
3.5.2. Nature of perspective manipulations 
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Third- and first-person instructions were clearly described in seven 
studies (Bagri & Jones, 2009; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Seih et al., 2011; 
Sekiguchi & Nonaka, 2014; Sutin & Robins, 2010).  Two studies reported giving 
descriptions of first-/third-person perspectives but do not provide examples 
(Crawley, 2010; Terry & Horton, 2007) and two studies (Robinson & Swanson, 
1993; Sutin & Robins, 2010) omit reference to perspective descriptions.  Three 
studies reported checking pronoun use as a manipulation check (Crawley, 2010; 
Seih et al., 2011), and two more studies reported post-task manipulation checks 
(Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Sutin & Robins, 2010). For more details of 
perspective manipulations, see Table 1. 
 
3.5.3. Affect outcomes 
There was no consistent picture of the impact of perspective in 
autobiographical memories.  Two studies found no link between the adoption of 
a third-person perspective and emotional intensity (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; 
Sutin & Robins, 2010). However, another study found reduced levels of emotion 
and nervousness from a third-person perspective (Terry & Horton, 2007). Third 
person recall was associated with reduced emotional involvement and emotional 
intensity in three writing studies (Crawley, 2010; Seih et al., 2011), although it 
was only linked to reduced negative affect in one (Crawley, 2010).  Recall of 
affective material in episodic memory tasks was lower in a third-person 
condition; in an initial study there was no difference in the reported “emotional 
richness” of recall, but in a second, potentially more highly powered study, this 
was lower in the third-person perspective (Bagri & Jones, 2009). 
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The original (i.e. spontaneous) perspective of a memory appears to have 
an important role in the effect of using a third- or first-person perspective. In 
three studies, levels of affect decreased only when first-person memories were 
recalled from the third-person, and not vice versa (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; 
Robinson & Swanson, 1993; Sekiguchi & Nonaka, 2014).  This implies that 
shifting from a third- to first-person memory does not intensify affect during 
recall.    
 
3.5.4. Methodological limitations 
Five studies did not report a manipulation check (Bagri & Jones, 2009; 
Robinson & Swanson, 1993; Sekiguchi & Nonaka, 2014; Terry & Horton, 2007). 
Berntsen and Rubin (2006) asked participants to rate the intensity of emotion at 
recall, and found no difference between perspectives.  However, the wording of 
this measure, “The emotions I have when I recall the episode are intense” 
(p.1199), could be argued to be ambiguous.  The “episode” refers to an event 
associated with an emotional state e.g. “most angry”.  However, it is possible that 
at recall, different emotions based on retrospective recall were also elicited, e.g. 
guilt at feeling angry, and that the ratings reflect this, rather than the original 
emotion.  
Sutin and Robins (2010) did not find a difference in affect when perspective 
was manipulated.  However, inspection of the reported means within the paper 
suggests that the mean emotional intensity of the manipulated first-person 
perspective is statistically lower than the spontaneously adopted (at recall) first-
person perspective (t(461) = 3.26, p = .001). This anomaly was not discussed by 
the authors.  
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The sample size used in both Seih et al studies (Seih et al., 2011, Studies 1 and 
2) was relatively small per condition (approximately n = 18-21 per condition), 
thus their study may not have had sufficient power to detect smaller effect-size 
reductions in negative affect.  Bagri and Jones’ first study (2009) failed to find a 
difference in 'emotional richness' between perspectives; however, their first study 
too may have been underpowered (n = 14 per group), since in their second study 
(n = 39, within-subjects), this effect was found. 
 
3.5.5. Additional reappraisal-related measures 
Seih and colleagues (2011) also assessed use of cognitive mechanism words 
(e.g. “consider,” “understand”) as a measure of cognitive processing, and found 
that the third-person perspective had lower levels of cognitive processing.  This 
appears to contrast studies such as those reviewed above (e.g. Kross et al., 2014) 
which have linked the third-person perspective to increased “semantic” 
processing, arguably a related construct.  This discrepancy may be explained by 
the instructions given to participants in Seih et al’s studies, i.e. a focus on “what” 
occurred rather than specifying a focus on “why.”  In other studies, only the 
“why” focused third-person perspective shows increased semantic processing 
(e.g. Kross et al., 2005). 
 
3.6. Positive emotions 
Four studies relating exclusively to positive memories or imagined positive 
events were identified (Gruber, Harvey, & Johnson, 2009; Holmes, Coughtrey, & 
Connor, 2008; Nelis, Vanbrabant, Holmes, & Raes, 2012; Vella & Moulds, 
2014). 
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3.6.1. Sample characteristics in positive emotion studies 
 
3.6.1.1. Recall of positive experience/thinking about positive 
events in non-clinical samples 
Two studies investigated experimentally-presented positive scenarios 
(Holmes et al., 2008; Nelis et al., 2012).  Despite focusing on positive emotions, 
both studies administered clinically relevant measures, the BDI-II (Beck et al., 
1996) and the State Trait Anxiety Inventory trait scale (STAI-T; Spielberger, 
Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) to establish levels of depressive and 
anxious symptomatology within their sample.  One study (Vella & Moulds, 
2014) investigated positive memories and imagined positive future events.   
 
3.6.1.2. Positive mood in a clinical sample 
One study (Gruber et al., 2009) compared the effect of changing 
perspective on memories of intense happiness using both a healthy control group 
and a euthymic group with bipolar I, a condition associated with elevated mood 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  The SCID-IV TR (First et al., 2002) 
was used to confirm bipolar diagnosis, and the healthy control group was 
screened for lifetime Axis-I disorders.  Bipolar participants were euthymic as 
indicated by the Young Mania Rating Scale (Young, Biggs, Ziegler, & Meyer, 
1978) and the Clinician-Rated Inventory of Depressive Symptoms (Rush, 
Gullion, Basco, Jarrett, & Trivedi, 1996); healthy controls were also screened 
using these measures and confirmed to be euthymic.   
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3.6.2. Nature of perspective manipulations 
Three studies specified gave clear and detailed instructions were given in 
three studies (Gruber et al., 2009; Holmes et al., 2008; Nelis et al., 2012).  One 
study used a Likert scale to rate the two perspectives (Vella & Moulds, 2014).  
For details of perspective manipulation, see Table 1. All four studies reported 
manipulations checks. 
 
3.6.3. Affect outcomes 
A decrease in positive affect linked to a third-person perspective was 
found in two studies, in both clinical and non-clinical populations (Gruber et al., 
2009; Holmes et al., 2008).  This was not replicated in another study (Nelis et al., 
2012) , in which while imagery increased positive affect compared to verbal 
processing, there was no difference between the two imagery perspectives.  
Shifting from the first- to third-person perspective for both positive memories 
and future imagined positive events, decreased positive emotions such as 
happiness, whereas the converse shift had no impact (Vella & Moulds, 2014).  
 
3.6.4. Methodological limitations 
In their replication study, Nelis and colleagues (Nelis et al., 2012) report 
a significant difference in levels of depressive symptomatology as measured by 
the BDI-II, with greater scores for those in the first-person condition.  The 
authors report that when BDI-II is entered as a covariate in their analyses, their 
null result regarding the two imagery perspectives remains.  However, this 
statistical technique has been advised against (Miller & Chapman, 2001).  More 
importantly, subsequent research (Nelis et al., 2013) has shown dysphoria is 
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associated with increased use of third-person perspective in positive memories.  
Thus, it is possible that the first-person condition, with higher levels of 
depressive symptomatology, may have had a greater tendency to initially 
experience scenarios from the third-person, even if they then followed first-
person instructions.  Research reviewed above in autobiographical memories 
suggests that there is no reduction in affect when moving from a third- to a first-
person perspective.  This may explain the lack of difference between the 
conditions.
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Table 1. 
Characteristics of the 40 included studies 
 
Study Participants Primary manipulation Conditions Outcome measures  Main findings  
 
Studies in low mood, n = 7 
 
Grisham et al 
(2011) 
Non-clinical 
student sample 
Written task; writing about a 
recent sad experience 
1. First-person (“rumination”) perspective 
(n = 40) 
2. Third-person (“reappraisal”) 
perspective (n = 41) 
Negative emotion (composite of six emotion 
words, 0-4 scale) 
Positive emotion (composite of five emotion 
words, 0-4 scale) 
Third- compared to first-person perspective 
Negative emotion at recall ↓ 
Positive emotion at recall ↑ 
Kross & Ayduk 
(2008), Study 1  
Non-clinical 
student sample 
Mental imagery; 
autobiographical memory of 
a depressive experience  
1. First-person (“immersed”) analysis of 
experience (n = 48)  
2. Third-person (“distanced”) analysis of 
experience (n = 48) 
3. Distraction, thinking about affectively 
neutral information (n = 45) 
Negative affect index calculated from the valence 
subscale of the Self Assessment Mannequin 
(SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1994), and ratings of 
“sadness” and “depression” (1-5 scale). 
Third- compared to first-person perspective 
Negative affect ↓ 
 
Third-person compared to distraction 
Negative affect  ↔ 
 
First-person compared to distraction 
Negative affect  ↑ 
Kross and Ayduk 
(2008), Study 2  
Non-clinical 
student sample 
Mental imagery; 
autobiographical memory of 
a depressive experience 
1. First-person (“immersed”) analysis of 
depressive experience, with 1 day 
follow-up (n = 56) and 7 day follow up 
(n = 40)  
2. Third-person (“distanced”) analysis of 
depressive experience with 1 day 
follow-up (n = 57) and 7 day follow up 
(n= 38) 
3. Distraction, thinking about affectively 
neutral information with 1 day follow-
up (n = 58) and 7 day follow up (n = 37) 
Negative affect index calculated from the valence 
subscale of the SAM (Bradley & Lang, 1994), 
and ratings of “sadness” and “depression” (1-5 
scale). 
Third- compared to first-person perspective 
Negative affect ↓ 
 
Third-person compared to distraction 
Negative affect  ↔ 
 
First-person compared to distraction 
Negative affect  ↑ 
 
At follow-up (1/7 day)  
Third- compared to first-person perspective/distraction 
Negative affect ↓ 
 
First-person compared to distraction 
Negative affect  ↔ 
Kross and Ayduk 
(2009) 
Subclinical 
student sample 
(depression 
symptoms) 
Mental imagery; multiple 
regression using depression 
data from five perspective 
manipulation studies 
1. First-person (“immersed”) analysis of 
depression or anger related experience  
2. Third-person (“distanced”) analysis of 
depression or anger related experience  
 
n = 477 with Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996) data. 
Emotional reactivity (various emotion measures, 
scores standardised for analysis). 
Third-person perspective  
Emotional reactivity ↓  
(regardless of depression symptoms) 
 
First-person perspective 
Emotional reactivity ↑ 
(positively correlated with depression symptoms) 
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Study Participants Primary manipulation Conditions Outcome measures  Main findings  
 
Kross et al (2012)  Clinical sample 
(Adults with 
major 
depressive 
disorder; MDD) 
and healthy 
control group 
Mental imagery; sad 
autobiographical memory 
1. First-person (“immersed”) analysis of 
sadness experience, (n = 25 MDD, n = 
21 control)  
2. Third-person (“distanced”) analysis of 
sadness experience (n = 26 MDD, n = 
24 control)  
Negative affect: SAM (Bradley & Lang, 1994). 
 
Negative affect index calculated from the SAM 
and the Negative scale of the Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule (Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988). 
Third person perspective: MDD 
Baseline-post negative affect ↓ (trend) 
Negative affect index ↓ 
 
First person perspective: MDD 
Baseline-post negative affect ↑ 
Negative affect index ↑ 
 
First- and third-person perspective: Control 
Negative affect ↔ 
Williams and 
Moulds (2008) 
Dysphoric 
subclinical 
sample 
Mental imagery; intrusive 
negative memory 
1. Spontaneously adopted (at recall) first-
person perspective “negative intrusive 
memories” recalled from the third-
person perspective (n = 78) 
2. Spontaneously adopted (at recall) third-
person perspective “negative intrusive 
memories” recalled from the first-person 
perspective (n = 55) 
Distress (0-100 scale)  
Richness of emotion recollection (1-7 scale) 
Anxiety at recollection (1-7 scale)  
 
Changing from a first- to a third-person perspective 
Richness of emotion ↔ 
Distress ↓ 
Anxiety compared to converse shift ↓  
 
Changing from a third- to a first-person perspective  
Richness of emotion ↔ 
Levels of distress ↔ 
Anxiety compared to converse shift ↑  
Wisco & Nolen-
Hoeksema (2011)  
Subclinical and 
control groups 
(High (≥ 16 
BDI-II) or low 
(≤ 9 BDI-II) 
dysphoria) 
 
Mental imagery; memory and 
imagery interpretation bias 
1. First-person (“immersed”) analysis of 
depression experience, and of guided 
imagery of ambiguous situations 
(n = 28 non-dysphoric, n = 25 
dysphoric) 
2. Third-person (“distanced”) analysis of 
depression experience, and of guided 
imagery of ambiguous situations 
(n = 30 non-dysphoric, n = 27 
dysphoric) 
State negative emotion calculated from ratings of 
sadness and depression (1-9 scale) 
 
Emotion re-experiencing extent 
 
Emotion re-experiencing intensity 
Third- and first-person perspective: memory  
State negative emotion ↑ (greater increase for dysphoria 
group) 
Re-experiencing extent ↔ (no difference between groups) 
 
Third- compared to first-person perspective: memory  
Re-experiencing intensity ↓ (no difference between groups) 
 
First- and third-perspective:  guided imagery  
State negative emotion ↑ (no difference between groups) 
Valence of interpretation ↔ (no difference between groups) 
Studies in anxiety/threat, n = 7 
 
Kross et al (2014), 
Study 2 
Non-clinical 
female student 
sample  
 
Verbal “self-talk” in a social 
evaluation task. 
1. First-person pronoun analysis of 
feelings (n = 44) 
2. Third-person (“non-first”) pronoun 
analysis of feelings (n = 45) 
Anxiety (1-5 scale) Third- compared to first-person perspective  
Pre-task anxiety ↔  
Post-task anxiety faster ↓ 
Kross et al (2014), 
Study 3 
Non-clinical 
student sample  
 
Verbal “self-talk” in a social 
stress induction task 
1. First-person pronoun analysis of 
feelings (n = 45) 
2. Third-person (“non-first”) pronoun 
analysis of feelings (n = 44) 
Negative affect (1-7 scale) 
Post-task shame  
Shame and Pride subscale of State Shame and 
Guilt Scale (Marschall, Sanftner, & Tangney, 
Third-person perspective 
Negative affect pre-post ↔ 
 
First-person perspective 
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Study Participants Primary manipulation Conditions Outcome measures  Main findings  
 
1994). Negative affect pre-post ↑  
 
Third- compared to first-person perspective 
Post-task shame ↓ 
Kross et al (2014), 
Study 4 
Non-clinical 
student sample  
 
Verbal “self-talk” in a social 
stress induction task 
1. First-person pronoun analysis of 
feelings (n = 37) 
2. Third-person (“non-first”) pronoun 
analysis of feelings (n = 38) 
Anticipatory anxiety (1-7 scale) 
Task threat (1-7 scale) 
Task challenge (1-7 scale) 
 
Third- compared to first-person perspective 
Anticipatory anxiety ↓ 
Task threat ↓ 
Task challenge ↑ 
Lau et al (2009) Non-clinical 
student sample  
Mental imagery; recall of 
inclusion or ostracism 
experience 
1. First-person perspective recall of either 
inclusion or ostracism experience  
2. Third-person perspective recall of either 
inclusion or ostracism experience  
 
N per condition not reported.  Sample n = 56, 
approx. n = 14 per group. 
Threatened needs 
Primary Needs Questionnaire (Zadro et al., 2004) 
including self-esteem, belonging and meaningful 
existence. 
Third- compared to first-person perspective (ostracism 
group) 
Threatened needs at time 1 ↔  
Threatened needs at time 2 ↑ 
 
First-/third-person perspective (inclusion group) 
Threatened needs at time 1 and 2 ↔ 
Seih et al (2008) Subclinical 
sample (divided 
into high, 
moderate and 
low anxiety) 
Written task; daily events 
diary study 
1. 10 day diary writing from first-, then 
second-, then third-person pronouns  (n 
= 32 high anxiety, n = 29 moderate 
anxiety, n = 27 low anxiety) 
 
Positive emotion 
Anger 
Sadness  
Anxiety 
(as measured by a modified version of general 
emotional scales (Fisher, 2000)). 
High anxiety group compared to moderate and low 
Anxiety ↓ 
Anger ↓ (trend) 
Sadness (not reported) 
Positive emotion (not reported) 
Spurr & Stopa 
(2003) 
Subclinical and 
control groups 
(high and low 
social anxiety) 
 
Mental imagery; speech task Within-subjects design 
 
1. First-person perspective adopted while 
giving filmed presentation  
2. Third-person perspective adopted while 
giving filmed presentation  
 
Order counterbalanced (n = 22 high anxiety, 
n = 22 low anxiety).  
Anxiety measured pre- and post each 
presentation (0-100 scale). 
Third-person perspective 
Both groups, anxiety pre-post ↔ (although trend to ↑) 
 
First-person perspective 
Both groups, anxiety pre-post ↔ 
Wang et al (2012) Internet-based 
sample of 
Taiwan 
residents, high 
and low anxious 
or avoidant 
attachment 
Written task; writing about a 
conflict scenario 
1. Writing from first-person perspective (n 
= 40) 
2. Writing from third-person perspective (n 
= 43) 
Negative emotion calculated from eight 
aggregated negative emotion scores, e.g. fear and 
hostility (1-7 scale). 
 
Positive emotion calculated from six aggregated 
positive emotion scores, e.g. peace and happiness 
(1-7 scale). 
 
Third- compared to first-person perspective  
Negative emotion ↓ 
Positive emotion ↔ 
 
Third-person perspective in low compared to high avoidant 
attachment 
Negative emotion ↓ 
Positive emotion ↔ 
 
First-person perspective in low compared to high avoidant 
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attachment 
Negative emotion ↔ 
Positive emotion ↔ 
 
Third- compared to first-person perspective in low and high 
anxious attachment 
Negative emotion ↓ 
Positive emotion ↑ (low anxious attachment only) 
Studies in anger, n = 6 
 
Ayduk & Kross 
(2008) 
Non-clinical 
student sample 
 
Mental imagery; 
autobiographical memory of 
feeling anger 
1. First-person (“self-immersed”) analysis  
2. Third-person (“self-distanced”) analysis  
 
N per condition not reported.  Sample n = 84 
after exclusions, approx. n = 42 per group. 
Emotional reactivity index computed from extent 
to which and intensity with which original 
emotions were experienced (1-7 scale). 
 
Third- compared to first-person perspective 
Emotional reactivity ↓ 
Kross et al (2005), 
Study 1 
Non-clinical 
student sample 
 
 
Mental imagery; 
autobiographical memory of 
feeling anger/hostility  
1. First-person perspective “what” focus 
on memory (n = 38) 
2. First-person perspective “why” focus (n 
= 39) 
3. Third-person perspective “what” focus 
on memory (n = 39) 
4. Third-person perspective “why” focus 
on memory (n = 39) 
Implicit anger measured through a word 
completion task (Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, 
Pyszczynski, & Simon, 1997). 
Negative affect measured by the Negative Affect 
subscale of the Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule (Watson et al., 1988). 
Explicit anger index computed from responses to 
‘hostile’ and ‘irritable’ in PANAS.  
Third-person “why” perspective compared to first-person 
“why” and first/third-person “what” perspectives 
Implicit anger ↓ 
Negative affect ↓ 
Explicit anger ↓ 
 
 
Kross et al (2005), 
Study 2 
Non-clinical 
student sample 
 
Mental imagery; 
autobiographical memory of 
feeling anger/hostility 
1. First-person perspective “why” focus on 
memory 
2. Third-person perspective “why” focus 
on memory 
 
N per condition not reported.  Sample n = 
133, approx n = 66 per group. 
Emotional reactivity index computed from extent 
to which and intensity with which original 
emotions were experienced (1-7 scale). 
Third- compared to first-person perspective 
Emotional reactivity ↓ 
Mischkowski et al 
(2012), Experiment 
1 
Non-clinical 
student sample 
Mental imagery; analysis of 
experimentally provoked 
anger experience 
1. First-person perspective (n = 28) 
2. Third-person perspective (n = 30) 
3. No perspective manipulation control (n 
= 36) 
Implicit aggression measured through a word 
completion task (Arndt et al., 1997). 
 
Anger index computed from the valence subscale 
of the SAM (Bradley & Lang, 1994) and four 
emotion word ratings (e.g. angry/hostile; 1-5 
scale). 
Third- compared to first-person perspective and control 
Implicit aggression ↓ 
Anger ↓ 
Ray et al (2008) Non-clinical 
student sample, 
Unresolved angering event 
(modality not specified) 
3. First-person (“rumination”) perspective 
(n = 34) 
Anger (0-4 scale) 
Negative emotion computed from composite of 
Third- compared to first-person perspective 
Anger at recall ↓ 
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all female 
 
4. Third-person (“reappraisal”) 
perspective (n = 43) 
 
six emotion words (0-4 scale). 
Positive emotion computed from composite of 
five emotion words (0-4 scale). 
Anger after rest ↔ 
Negative emotion at recall and after rest ↓ 
Positive emotion at recall and after rest ↔ 
Wimalaweera & 
Moulds (2008) 
Non-clinical 
student sample 
 
Mental imagery; 
autobiographical memory of 
feeling anger in previous 12 
months 
1. First-person perspective “what” focus 
on memory 
2. First-person perspective “why” focus on 
memory 
3. Third-person perspective “what” focus 
on memory 
4. Third-person perspective “why” focus 
on memory  
 
N  per condition not reported.  Sample n = 60 
after exclusions, approx. n = 15 per group. 
 
 
Implicit anger measured through a word 
completion task (Arndt et al., 1997). 
 
Explicit anger computed from items (e.g. 
“anger/hostile/irritable”) from the Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule (expanded form) 
(Watson & Clark, 1994). 
 
Negative affect subscale of Positive and Negative 
Affect Schedule (expanded form) (Watson & 
Clark, 1994). 
 
Third-person “why” perspective  compared to first-person 
“why” and first/third-person “what” perspectives 
Implicit anger ↑ 
 
First-person “what” and “why, and third-person “why” 
perspectives 
Explicit anger over time ↑ 
 
Third-person “what” perspective 
Explicit anger over time ↔ 
 
First-person “why,” and third-person “why” perspectives 
Negative affect over time ↑ 
 
First-person “what,” and third-person “what” perspectives 
Negative affect over time ↔ 
Studies in self-conscious emotions, n = 7 
 
Hung & 
Mukhopadhyay 
(2012), Study 1 
Non-clinical 
student sample 
 
 
Mental imagery; imagining 
“self-control” scenario of 
either accepting or declining 
a party invitation before an 
exam 
1. First-person perspective of self-control 
2. Third-person perspective of self-
control 
3. First-person perspective of non self-
control 
4. Third-person perspective of non self-
control 
 
N per condition not reported.  Sample n = 
288, approx. n = 72 
 per group. 
Negative ‘basic’ emotion computed from average 
of ratings of “sad”, “distressed” and “sorrowful” 
(1-4 scale). 
 
Negative self-conscious emotion computed from 
rating of “guilty” (1-4 scale). 
 
Positive ‘basic’ emotion computed from average 
of ratings of “excited” and “joyful” (1-4 scale). 
 
Positive self-conscious emotion computed from 
average of ratings of “proud” and “relieved” (1-4 
scale). 
Third- compared to first-person perspective (self-control) 
Negative basic emotion ↓ 
Positive basic emotion ↔ 
Positive self-conscious emotion ↑ 
Negative self-conscious emotion ↔ 
 
Third- compared to first-person perspective (non self-
control) 
Positive basic emotion ↓  
Negative basic emotion ↔ 
Negative self-conscious emotion ↑  
Positive self-conscious emotion ↔ 
 
Hung & 
Mukhopadhyay 
(2012), Study 2 
Non-clinical 
student sample 
 
 
Mental imagery; 
autobiographical memory of 
resisting or succumbing to 
temptation 
1. First-person perspective in recall of 
resisting temptation 
2. Third-person perspective in recall of 
resisting temptation 
3. First-person perspective in recall of  
succumbing to temptation 
Sad (1-7 scale) 
Guilt (1-7 scale) 
Pride (1-7 scale) 
Excitement (1-7 scale) 
Embarrassment (1-7 scale) 
 
Third- compared to first-person perspective (resist) 
Sad ↓ 
Guilt ↔ 
Pride ↑ 
Excitement ↔ 
Embarrasment ↔ 
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4. Third-person perspective in recall of  
succumbing to temptation 
 
N per condition not reported.  Sample n = 
75, approx. n = 18 per group. 
 
Third- compared to first-person perspective (succumb) 
Guilt ↑ 
Sad ↔ 
Pride ↔  
Excitement ↓  
Embarrasment ↔  
Hung & 
Mukhopadhyay 
(2012), Study 3 
Non-clinical 
student sample 
 
 
Mental imagery; imagining 
an embarrassing but exciting 
scenario  
1. First-person perspective of imagined 
exciting/embarrasing experience  
2. Third-person perspective of imagined 
exciting/embarrasing experience 
 
N per condition not reported.  Sample n = 
26, approx. n = 13 per group. 
Excitement (1-7 scale) 
Embarrassment (1-7 scale) 
Sad (1-7 scale) 
Guilt (1-7 scale) 
Pride (1-7 scale) 
 
Third- compared to first-person perspective  
Excitement ↓ 
Embarrasment ↑ 
Sad ↔ 
Guilt ↔ 
Pride ↔  
 
Katzir & Eyal 
(2013), Study 1 
Non-clinical 
student sample 
Mental imagery; 
autobiographical memory of 
feeling anger or guilt 
1. First-person perspective “why” focus 
on anger  
2. First-person perspective “why” focus 
on guilt 
3. Third-person perspective “why” focus 
on anger 
4. Third-person perspective “why” focus 
on guilt 
 
N per condition not reported.  Sample n = 
241 after exclusions, approx. n = 60 per 
group. 
Emotional reactivity index computed from extent 
to which, and intensity with which original 
emotions were experienced (1-9 scale). 
Third- compared to first-person perspective 
Anger ↓ 
Guilt ↔ 
Katzir & Eyal 
(2013), Study 2 
Non-clinical 
student sample 
Mental imagery; 
autobiographical memory of 
feeling sadness or shame 
1. First-person perspective “why” focus 
on sadness  
2. First-person perspective “why” focus 
on shame 
3. Third-person perspective “why” focus 
on sadness 
4. Third-person perspective “why” focus 
on shame 
 
N per condition not reported.  Sample n = 
254 after exclusions, approx. n = 63 per 
group. 
Emotional reactivity index computed from extent 
to which and intensity with which original 
emotions were experienced (1-9 scale). 
Third- compared to first-person perspective 
Sadness ↓ 
Shame ↔ 
Libby et al (2011), 
Study 4 
Subclinical 
student sample 
Mental imagery; imagining 
possible future failure 
1. Imagining scenarios from a first-person 
perspective (n = 33) 
Shame (guilt-free) calculated from the Test of 
Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA; Tangney & 
Third-person perspective 
Self-esteem negatively correlated with shame 
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(high to low 
self-esteem) 
 
scenarios 2. Imagining scenarios from a first-person 
perspective (n = 33) 
Dearing, 2003). 
 
 
First-person perspective 
No relationship between self-esteem and shame 
Libby et al (2011), 
Study 5 
Subclinical 
student sample 
(high to low 
self-esteem) 
 
 
Mental imagery; 
autobiographical memory of 
failure, success and neutral 
experiences 
1. First-person perspective recall of failure 
experience  
2. Third-person perspective recall of 
failure experience  
3. First-person perspective recall of 
success experience  
4. Third-person perspective recall of 
success experience  
5. First-person perspective recall of 
neutral experience  
6. Third-person perspective recall of 
neutral experience  
 
N per condition not reported.  Sample n = 
128 after exclusions, approx. n = 21 per 
group. 
Shame (guilt-free) calculated from “ashamed” 
and “guilty” items of the Positive and Negative 
Affect Schedule (Watson et al., 1988) 
Third- compared to first-person perspective (failure 
memory) 
Self-esteem negatively correlated with shame 
LSE, Shame ↑ 
HSE, Shame ↓ 
 
Third- compared to first-person perspective (success and 
neutral memories) 
No relationship between self-esteem and shame 
 
Studies in positive/negative autobiographical memories, n = 10 
 
Bagri and Jones 
(2009), Experiment 
1 
Non clinical 
student sample 
Mental imagery; Memory 
task, scenario descriptions  
1. Recall from a first-person perspective 
(n = 14) 
2. Recall from a third-person perspective 
(n = 14)  
Emotional richness of memory recall 
Recall of affective detail 
Third- compared to first-person perspective 
Emotional richness ↔ 
Recall for affective detail ↓ 
Bagri and Jones 
(2009),  Experiment 
2 
Non clinical 
student sample 
Mental imagery; Memory 
task, scenario descriptions 
Within-subjects design 
 
1. Recall from first- and then third-person 
perspective or vice versa (n = 39) 
Order counterbalanced 
Emotional richness of memory recall 
Recall of affective detail 
Third- compared to first-person perspective 
Emotional richness ↓ 
Recall for affective detail ↓ 
Berntsen & Rubin 
(2006) 
Non-clinical 
student sample 
 
Mental imagery; ten positive 
and negative 
autobiographical memories  
1. Recall of memories from an instructed 
first-person perspective, followed by a 
switch to third-person perspective for 
two memories (n = 40) 
2. Recall of memories from an instructed 
third-person perspective, followed by a 
switch to first-person perspective for 
two memories (n = 42) 
3. Recall of memories from spontaneously 
adopted perspective, followed by a 
Emotional intensity (1-7 scale) Third- compared to first-person recall (instructed and 
spontanously adopted) 
Emotional intensity ↔ 
 
Third- to first-person perspective shift 
Emotional intensity ↔ 
 
First- to third-person perspective shift 
Emotional intensity ↓ 
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switch to opposite perspective (first and 
third) for two memories (n = 40) 
Crawley (2010) Non-clinical 
student/ 
volunteer 
sample 
 
 
Written task; an unpleasant 
event recalled from a 
spontaneously adopted first-
person perspective  
1. First-person perspective, writing once 
about the memory from same 
perspective. 
2. First-person perspective, writing three 
times about the memory from same 
perspective. 
3. First-person perspective, writing once 
about the memory from same 
perspective, and then twice from a 
third-person perspective. 
 
N per condition not reported.  Sample n = 90, 
approx. n = 30 per group. 
Emotion at time of event (1-7 scale): 
Negative 
Intensity 
Physical/bodily 
Positive 
Emotion at recall (1-7 scale): 
Negative 
Intensity 
Physical/bodily 
Positive 
 
At time of event: 
Repeated third-person perspective 
Negative ↓  
Intensity ↓ 
Physical/bodily ↓ 
Positive ↔ 
 
Repeated first-person perspective  
Negative ↑  
Intensity ↔ 
Physical/bodily ↓ 
Positive ↔ 
 
At recall: 
Repeated third-person perspective group 
Negative ↓ 
Intensity ↓ 
Physical/bodily ↓ 
Positive ↑ 
 
Repeated first-person perspective group 
Negative ↓ 
Intensity ↓ 
Physical/bodily ↓  
Positive ↔ 
Robinson & 
Swanson (1993), 
Experiment 2 
Non-clinical 
student sample 
 
Mental imagery; 
autobiographical memories 
1. Twelve autobiographical memories 
(both perspectives) recalled from a 
first-person perspective 
2. Twelve autobiographical memories 
(both perspectives) recalled from a 
third-person perspective 
 
N per condition not reported.  Sample n = 56, 
approx. n = 28 per group. 
Original intensity (1-7 scale) 
Current intensity (1-7 scale) 
Current affect awareness (remembering feelings 
at time; 1-7 scale) 
Original pleasantness (1-7 scale) 
Current pleasantness (1-7 scale) 
Third- to first-person perspective shift 
Original and current intensity ↔  
Current affect awareness ↔  
Original pleasantness ↔  
Current pleasantness ↔  
 
 
First- to third-person perspective shift 
Original and current intensity ↓ 
Current affect awareness ↓ 
Original pleasantness ↔  
Current pleasantness ↔  
Seih et al (2011), Non-clinical Written task; an upsetting 1. First-person perspective (“I”) Emotional involvement overall (1-7 scale) Third- compared to first- and second-person perspectives 
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Study 1 student sample 
 
 
autobiographical memory 2. Second-person perspective (“you”) 
3. Third-person perspective (“he/she”) 
 
N per condition not reported.  Sample n = 55, 
approx. n =18 per group. 
Emotional involvement post-writing (1-7 scale) 
Positive affect calculated from the mean of 5 
positive items (1-5 scale) (Diener & Emmons, 
1984). 
Negative affect calculated from the mean of 6 
negative items (1-5 scale). 
Emotional involvement overall ↓ 
Emotional involvement post-writing ↓ (trend) 
Positive affect ↔ 
Negative affect ↔ 
 
Seih et al (2011), 
Study 2 
Non-clinical 
student sample 
 
Written task; an upsetting 
autobiographical memory 
1. Writing in first-, then second, then 
third-person perspective. 
2. Writing in first-, then third, then 
second-person perspective. 
3. Writing in third-, then second, then 
first-person perspective. 
4. Writing in third-, then first, then 
second-person perspective. 
5. Writing in second-, then first, then 
third-person perspective. 
6. Writing in second-, then third, then 
first-person perspective. 
 
N per condition not reported.  Sample n = 
129, approx. n = 21 per group. 
Emotional involvement overall (1-7 scale) 
Emotional involvement post-writing (1-7 scale) 
Positive affect calculated from the mean of 5 
positive items (1-5 scale) (Diener & Emmons, 
1984). 
Negative affect calculated from the mean of 6 
negative items (1-5 scale). 
Perspective switching 
Emotional involvement overall ↔ 
Emotional involvement post-writing ↔ (trend) 
Positive affect ↔ 
Negative affect ↔ 
 
Third- and second- person compared to first-person 
perspectives 
Emotional involvement post-writing ↓  
Positive affect ↔ 
Negative affect ↔ 
 
 
 
Sekiguchi & 
Nonaka (2014) 
Non-clinical 
student sample 
 
Mental imagery; positive and 
negative autobiographical 
memories 
1. Recall of memories from spontaneously 
adopted perspective (first/third) at time 
1 (T1), time 2 (T2) and with no 
perspective instructions at time 3 (T3). 
2. Recall of memories from spontaneously 
adopted perspective (first/third) at T1, 
the opposite perspective at T2, and with 
no perspective instructions at T3. 
 
N per condition not reported.  Sample n = 48, 
approx. n = 24 per group. 
Emotional intensity (1-5 scale) Third- to first-person perspective, at T2 and T3, compared 
to T1 
Emotional intensity ↔ 
 
First- to third-person perspective, at T2 and T3, compared to 
T1 
Emotional intensity ↓ 
 
 
Sutin and Robins 
(2010), Study 2 
Non-clinical 
student sample 
 
 
Mental imagery; self-
defining memories 
1. Recall from spontaneously adopted 
perspective  (n = 450) 
2. Recall from instructed first-person 
perspective (n = 128) 
3. Recall from instructed third-person 
perspective (n = 128)  
Emotion intensity measured on the Memory 
Experiences Questionnaire (Sutin & Robins, 
2007). 
Third- compared to first-person perspective (spontaneously 
adopted at initial recall) 
Emotion intensity ↓ 
 
Third- compared to first-person perspective (instructed) 
Emotion intensity ↔ 
Terry and Horton 
(2007) 
Non clinical 
student sample 
Mental imagery; unpleasant, 
emotional and self-conscious 
Within-subjects design 
 
Degree of emotion (1-5 scale) 
Nervous (1-5 scale) 
Third- compared to first-person perspective 
Degree of emotion ↓ 
52 
 
Study Participants Primary manipulation Conditions Outcome measures  Main findings  
 
autobiographical memories 1. Recall from either first- and then third-
person perspective or vice-versa; 
followed by participant comparison of 
the two perspectives (n = 24) 
  
Order counterbalanced. 
Self-consciousness (1-5 scale) 
Uneasiness (no scale given) 
 
Nervous ↓ 
Self-consciousness ↓ 
 
Participant comparison of third- compared to first-person 
perspective  
Degree of emotion ↓ 
Nervous ↓ 
Uneasiness ↓ 
Studies in positive emotions/memories, n = 4 
 
Gruber et al (2009) Clinical sample 
(Adults with 
bipolar I 
disorder; BP) 
and healthy 
control group 
Mental imagery; 
autobiographical memory of 
intense happiness 
Within-subjects design 
 
1. First-person perspective ‘why’ analysis 
of memory follow by third-person 
perspective ‘why’ analysis of memory, 
or vice versa (counterbalanced) 
(n = 27 BP, n = 27 control) 
Positive affect  
Positive subscale of the PANAS – Short Form 
(Mackinnon et al., 1999) 
 
Number of positive thoughts (1-6 scale) 
Third-person compared to first-person perspective (both 
groups) 
Positive affect ↓ 
Number of positive thoughts ↓ 
Holmes et al (2008) Non clinical 
university 
sample 
 
Mental imagery or verbal 
processing of positive 
imaginary scenarios 
1. Imagining scenarios from a first-person 
perspective 
2. Imagining scenarios from a third-
person perspective 
3. Verbal processing of scenarios 
  
N per condition not reported.  Sample n = 78, 
approx. n = 26 per group. 
Positive affect  
Positive subscale of the PANAS (21 items) 
(Watson et al., 1988) 
Third-person perspective and verbal condition  
Positive affect ↓ ↔  
 
First-person perspective 
Positive affect ↑ 
Nelis et al (2012)  Non-clinical 
student sample 
Mental imagery or verbal 
processing of positive 
imaginary scenarios 
1. Imagining scenarios from a first-person 
perspective 
2. Imagining scenarios from a third-
person perspective 
3. Verbal processing of scenarios 
 
N per condition not reported.  Sample n = 78, 
approx. n = 26 per group 
Positive affect  
PANAS positive subscale (10 items) (Watson et 
al., 1988) 
Third- and first-person perspective compared to verbal 
condition 
Positive affect ↑ 
 
Third-person compared to first-person perspective 
Positive affect ↔ 
 
Vella & Moulds 
(2014) 
Non-clinical 
student sample 
 
Positive autobiographical 
memory and imagined 
positive future event 
1. First-person memory recall switching to 
third-person perspective (n = 42) 
2. Third-person memory recall switching 
to first-person perspective (n = 32) 
 
And 
 
Happiness (0-100 scale) 
Optimism (0-100 scale) 
Hopefulness (0-100 scale) 
Memory recall 
Third- to first-person perspective shift  
Happiness ↔ 
Optimism ↔ 
Hopefulness ↔  
First- to third-person perspective shift  
Happiness ↓ 
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3. First-person imagined event switching 
to third-person perspective (n = 35) 
4. First-person imagined event switching 
to third-person perspective (n = 38) 
 
Optimism ↓ 
Hopefulness ↓ 
 
Imagined event 
Third- to first-person perspective shift  
Happiness ↔ 
Optimism ↔ 
Hopefulness ↔  
First- to third-person perspective shift  
Happiness ↓ 
Optimism ↓ 
Hopefulness ↓ (trend) 
Note. ↑ = increased levels of affect; ↔ = no significant difference between groups or pre-post; ↓ = decreased levels of affect. 
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4. Discussion 
This review aimed to explore the effect of changes in vantage perspective on 
affect. Overall, most studies identified in this review found that the use of a 
third-person perspective was associated with reduced negative affect or affect 
intensity in both clinical and non-clinical populations.  
 
4.1. Perspective change in low mood and anxiety 
Several studies investigated the impact of perspective on low mood and 
depressive experiences. The studies reviewed in this paper indicate that for both 
non-clinical participants, and those with depressive symptoms, strategic use of 
the third-person perspective when recalling upsetting memories is generally 
linked to lower negative affect or emotional intensity. This would appear to 
indicate that the third-person perspective could be an effective emotion 
regulation strategy.  Indeed, one study showed that this was effective for people 
diagnosed with major depressive disorder, with concomitant clinical 
implications (Kross et al., 2012).  However, people with depression appear 
already to show an increased spontaneous tendency to recall negative 
autobiographical memories from the third-person perspective compared to 
controls (Kuyken & Howell, 2006). This would seem to indicate that when used 
spontaneously, for people with depression this strategy does not function to 
alleviate low mood in the long-term. The perspective of positive memories in 
depression was not considered by any study in this review, so this cannot be 
further elucidated. 
However, as the third-person perspective appears to be linked to avoidance in 
clinical populations in both negative and positive memories in depression 
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(Bergouignan et al., 2008; Kuyken & Moulds, 2009; Lemogne et al., 2006; 
Williams & Moulds, 2007), this could indicate that when used spontaneously, 
the third-person perspective is being employed as a strategy to reduce or avoid 
distress rather than to engage with the content of the memory as a form of 
reappraisal.  Lemogne and colleagues (Lemogne et al., 2009) found that higher 
levels of avoidance on a questionnaire measure were linked to an increased 
tendency to retrieve negative memories from a third-person perspective for 
healthy controls, supporting the idea that the third-person perspective can serve 
an avoidant function.  One possible difference in the strategic use of a third-
person perspective might be that the recall instructions in a number of the 
studies asked participants to consider “why” the recalled events had happened.  
It may be that in clinical populations, typical recall involving third-person 
perspective focuses only on “what” happened, rather than “why.”  
Given the number of studies investigating links between anxiety disorders and 
use of a third-person perspective, there are surprisingly few studies identified in 
this review that addressed anxiety experimentally.   The pattern found, however, 
is similar to that seen with low mood, i.e. that using the third-person perspective 
was mostly linked to lower negative affect and anxiety.  This contrasts with 
some anxiety disorders in which there is an increased use of this visual 
perspective in anxiety disorders, where anxiety levels are by definition higher 
than non-clinical populations.  Indeed, experimental evidence has shown that 
high levels of worry are linked to increased use of the third-person perspective 
(Finnbogadóttir & Berntsen, 2014).  However, this too is suggestive that people 
with anxiety disorders may be using a detached perspective to manage affect in 
the short-term and that this may have a long-term cost.  
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4.2. Effect of perspective change on individual emotions 
The studies reviewed here indicate a potential difference in the impact of the 
third-person perspective between some “basic” emotions, and those that have a 
degree of self-consciousness or self-evaluation.   
Most of the studies found that basic emotions such as anger reduced when an 
event was considered from a third-person perspective, provided the focus was 
on “why” the event happened, not “what” happened (Ayduk & Kross, 2008; 
Katzir & Eyal, 2013, Study 1; Kross et al., 2005; Mischkowski et al., 2012).  
The pattern of a decrease in affect with a third-person perspective was also seen 
in most of the studies relating to positive emotions and memories (Gruber et al., 
2009; Holmes et al., 2008; Vella & Moulds, 2014). The non-replication of this 
pattern (Nelis et al., 2012) may be due to a failure to consider fully the role of 
depressive symptoms in perspective of positive memories (Nelis et al., 2013). 
However, in studies addressing self-conscious emotions, the third-person 
perspective did not consistently reduce negative affect, showing no decrease in 
two studies (Katzir & Eyal, 2013) and increases in others (Hung & 
Mukhopadhyay, 2012).    Two key elements may have an impact on whether a 
third-person perspective increases self-conscious emotion.  Firstly, although the 
memories elicited in Katzir and Eyal’s study were theoretically linked to self-
conscious emotions (guilt and shame), there was no instruction to consider the 
others’ evaluation of the self as was implicit in the design of Hung and 
Mukhopadhyay’s three studies. This may also explain why in Katzir and Eyal’s 
study, the third-person perspective did not increase negative affect.    
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Secondly, low self-esteem, a transdiagnostic difficulty, was shown to be an 
important factor in whether the third-person perspective increased or decreased 
shame (Libby et al., 2011).  Libby and colleagues link this to the influence of 
“self-defeating interpretive frameworks” (p. 1171.); this implies that the context 
within which the self is evaluated interacts with perspective.  Thus it may not be 
that the third-person perspective itself increases negative self-conscious affect 
but that how people make sense or, or contextualise the situation, which has a 
significant influence. Vantage perspective has been linked to moral judgments 
of the self (Agerstrom, Bjorklund, & Carlsson, 2013), indicating that the 
broader context (e.g. societal or cultural) is also important in the impact of 
perspective. 
 
4.3. Perspective and autobiographical memories 
The third-person perspective in autobiographical memories, regardless of 
valence, was associated in most of the studies reviewed above with reduced 
affect, affective details or emotional involvement, with the exception of two 
studies (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; Sutin & Robins, 2010).  The original 
(spontaneously adopted) perspective of a memory appears to have an important 
role in whether a difference in affect is seen when instructions are provided to 
alter perspective.  All studies (including those reviewed in other sections, Vella 
& Moulds, 2014; Williams & Moulds, 2008) found a reduction in intensity of 
affect when shifting from an original first-person perspective to the third-
person, but no difference with the converse shift.  This would appear to indicate 
that while it is possible to reduce salient affective properties in a first- to third-
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person perspective shift, this is not spontaneously increased if the shift is from 
third- to first-person. 
This raises an intriguing point.  Few of the studies reviewed above established 
the original perspective associated with the memories, prior to instructing the 
recall perspective.  If the above pattern is generally true, it may be the case that 
when participants are instructed to take a third-person perspective regardless of 
spontaneous perspective, changes in affect tend to be due to changes from the 
more prevalent first-person memories (Nigro & Neisser, 1983).  Participants 
who spontaneously adopted a third-person perspective at instructed recall, 
regardless of subsequent perspective manipulation, should therefore tend to 
show a smaller reduction in affect. As such, larger effect sizes may be seen if 
the original perspective is included as a variable within experimental designs.  
Further, if use of the third-person represents avoidance, it raises a clinically 
relevant question as to whether emotional processing could be enacted through 
a shift in perspective from third- to first-person, as the affective detail may not 
be encoded within the memory.  Thus an alternative mechanism may be 
necessary for adaptive emotional processing, such as a change in the meaning of 
the memory. 
 
4.4. Role of appraisals and changing meaning  
Several of the studies identified in this review used a measure of semantic 
change in addition to emotional outcome measures (e.g. Kross et al., 2014).  In 
these studies, use of the third-person perspective in addition to a consideration 
of why the recalled event occurred was consistently linked to greater degrees of 
semantic change.  This may offer a key insight into the difference between use 
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of the third-person perspective as an avoidance strategy compared to one which 
promotes effective emotion regulation. When used to promote avoidance, an 
emotion regulation strategy argued to be ineffective (Hayes, Strosahl, & 
Wilson, 2011), the third-person perspective may functionally “freeze” the event, 
such that “what” happened is retained, but new, contextual information is not 
introduced.  Thus in the short-term, experienced affect is minimized by 
increasing the perceived distance between the affect-provoking event and the 
individual, without any further engagement or changes, and with potential long-
term consequences.   
However, when new information is introduced in the third-person perspective 
through engaging with why an event occurred, effective reappraisal may be 
possible, perhaps because the third-person perspective allows an event to be 
tolerated for long enough in working memory for regulatory information to be 
introduced.    Neuro-imaging studies indicate that during reappraisal, semantic 
information relating to emotional stimuli is altered, which attenuates the activity 
in the amygdala (Buhle et al., 2014), an area of the brain strongly associated 
with generating emotional responses (Gallagher & Chiba, 1996).  Thus adopting 
a third person perspective (Ochsner & Gross, 2008) may be of utility as a 
emotion regulation strategy only if this introduces new understanding.  
Clinically, the introduction of new and updated information is an important 
part of several treatment protocols, for example post-traumatic stress disorder 
and social phobia.  The treatment of post-traumatic stress involves the client 
reliving the most emotionally distressing parts of their trauma and then adding 
in updated information to this memory (Grey, Young, & Holmes, 2002).  Thus 
the meaning of the memory can change, allowing the memory to be processed 
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more adaptively.  In social phobia treatment, negative images based on early 
traumatic memories are also relived, and clients invited to update the image 
with more helpful information and introduce new perspectives into the image 
(Wild & Clark, 2011). 
 
4.5. General limitations 
It is possible that the third-person visual perspective, for example, adopted by 
those with clinically significant problems may be linked to qualitatively 
different images compared to controls.  Many studies have assumed that the 
third-person perspective offers a ‘neutral’, observer-like stance, but given the 
high levels of self-criticism and shame in most clinical populations, it is 
possible that the images are “distorted” and thus different to third-person 
images experienced by non-clinical populations.  For example, in social phobia, 
the use of video-feedback is important in helping people to experience a non-
distorted image of themselves in the third-person (Harvey, Clark, Ehlers, & 
Rapee, 2000; Rapee & Hayman, 1996).   Qualitative information on the nature 
of the images in the reviewed studies is lacking. 
 
4.6. Limitations of this review 
There are several limitations of this review.  The review limited its definition 
of perspective to that of the first- and third-person.  However, different types of 
perspective manipulation have also been shown to impact affect, for example, 
imagined increasing spatial distance.  When negative scenes are imagined as 
moving away, this is linked to lower negative affect (J. I. Davis, Gross, & 
Ochsner, 2011).  In addition to this, temporal perspective has been shown to 
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interact with vantage perspective (D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004, 
2012).  For example, memories and imagined future events which are further 
away temporally are more likely to be experienced from a third-person 
perspective, compared to those which are nearer temporally being experienced 
from a first-person perspective (D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004). 
This review concentrated on the impact of vantage perspective on affect, but 
other outcomes could have been considered.  For example, vantage perspective 
has been shown to impact behaviour, with a third-person perspective linked to 
an increase in non-health related behaviours such as voting and academic 
motivation (Libby, Shaeffer, Eibach, & Slemmer, 2007; Vasquez & Buehler, 
2007).  By contrast, first-person perspective appears to be linked to an increase 
in health-related behaviours such as giving up smoking for a day (Rennie, 
Harris, & Webb, 2014).  One study (Uskul & Kikutani, 2014) found that use of 
perspective was only significant when participants had high levels of concern 
about the evaluations of others.  For these participants, the third-person 
perspective was linked to greater behavioural intention to complete a public task 
(buying mouthwash). By contrast, when the task was private (teeth flossing), 
use of the first-person perspective was linked to greater behavioural intention 
and completion of the task.   
 
4.7. Implications for future research 
Most of the emotion outcome measures used in the studies reviewed here were 
single item measures.  In order to extend the work, future research would 
benefit from validated emotional measures.  This would also permit authors to 
ensure that groups are matched, and allow more robust conclusions to be 
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adopted in relation to the effect of any interventions on emotional outcome 
measures.  Further, given the links discussed above with semantic change as a 
mediator for cognitive change, studies would benefit from a measure of the 
extent to which semantic or meaning-based change has occurred.  Future studies 
should investigate the effect of perspective change within clinical populations; 
although some work has already started in this area (Kross et al., 2012), it 
remains unclear as to the effect in anxious populations for example. 
 
4.8. Clinical implications 
The studies identified in this review imply that the perspective adopted when 
recalling both positive and negative mental images/memories or the verbal 
reviewing of experiences (e.g. recalling the memory in written or spoken form) 
has implications for managing affect. The third-person perspective may offer a 
strategy to regulate emotion, but if used as an avoidance strategy, may 
perpetuate psychological difficulties. Studies of spontaneously adopted 
perspective in clinical populations suggest that a habitual tendency to adopt this 
perspective as an avoidant emotion regulation strategy may play a role in the 
maintenance of disorders.  
The apparent contrast between third-person perspective as an effective 
emotion regulation strategy and as characteristic of those with mood or anxiety 
disorders suggests that clinicians should carefully examine the perspective 
adopted in imagery to consider its effect on a client’s ability to engage with or 
manage affect.  Imagery-based assessment in cognitive therapies is an important 
part of treatment (Hales et al., 2014).  Using a micro-formulation, clinicians can 
investigate in detail the emotional, cognitive and behavioural implications of an 
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image experienced.  This review suggests that exploring the perspective adopted 
in the image has important emotional consequences, and could represent a target 
for intervention.  
It may also be the case that the impact of perspective interacts with people’s 
perception of their selves, for example either through self-esteem (Libby et al., 
2011) or through actions incongruous with self-concept (Libby & Eibach, 
2002).  To the author’s knowledge, no studies have investigated the typical 
perspective adopted in imagery within, for example, addiction processes, an 
area which would arguably link both self-esteem processes and, for those 
attempting to quit, self-concept.  Although cognitive strategies have been shown 
to be effective in reducing craving in smokers (Kober, Kross, Mischel, Hart, & 
Ochsner, 2010), this has concentrated on a reinterpretation based strategy rather 
than a perspective based one. 
Finally, this review has concentrated on one particular operalisation of 
perspective, but other therapies offer alternative and potentially complementary 
conceptualisations. So-called  ‘third-wave’ cognitive behavioural therapies, 
such as Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes et al., 2011) or 
mindfulness-based therapies (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002) encourage 
clients to become observers of their own experience, echoing Oschner and 
Gross’s (2008) description of adopting a detached perspective.  ACT techniques 
such as ‘defusion,’ in which therapeutic attention is shifted from addressing the 
content of thoughts to the process of thinking, could thus be argued to reflect a 
shift in perspective; the perspective accessed is a meta-position on thinking, but 
nonetheless introduces new information that potentially impacts the emotional 
experience of the client and/or helps direct behaviour.  
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The perspective adopted by individuals, whether that is a detached third-
person perspective, or a first-person perspective can have important 
implications for the experience and management of affect.  It does not appear to 
be the case that using either perspective is intrinsically adaptive or maladaptive; 
instead, the context and function of the perspective use are key components.  It 
is likely that increasing the flexibility with which either perspective is employed 
will increase its efficacy as an emotion regulation strategy, in addition to 
ensuring semantic change is introduced.   Thus, it may be the case that in some 
cases, a shift to the third-person perspective aids emotional regulation in the 
short term, but for longer term adaptive processing, new information also needs 
to be incorporated. 
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Abstract 
 
Craving plays an important role in the maintenance of addiction.  
Cognitive strategies have shown promise in regulating craving.  Although 
research is limited, mental imagery has been linked to craving experiences, 
and represents a neglected target for intervention.  Two craving regulation 
strategies focussing on mental imagery experienced by smokers were 
compared.  One was drawn from a cognitive psychological approach using 
alternative imagery and the other from a technique from the third-wave 
therapeutic approach Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, “defusion.” 
Effects of these strategies were examined on acute craving, smoking 
behaviour and approach-avoidance behaviour in a stimulus compatibility task.  
Both strategies were associated with a reduction in craving, at session 1 and at 
24 hr and 1 week follow-up.  In addition, mean number of daily cigarettes 
smoked reduced from baseline in both groups. However, the defusion group 
appeared to show a greater motivational bias towards smoking stimuli.  
Nonetheless, the findings suggest that there are no differences in craving and 
smoking behaviour between an ACT-based defusion strategy and a simple 
imagery-replacement strategy.  
 
  
 
 
  
 85 
Introduction 
Smoking cigarettes is widely acknowledged to be the cause of a major 
global health problem.  Research within the UK alone has suggested there is a 
£2.7 billion annual cost to the NHS of smoking related diseases (Callum, 
Boyle, & Sandford, 2011).  While developments in pharmacology, 
psychosocial treatments and health policy have had an impact on smoking 
rates, further innovation is essential if harms from nicotine addiction are to be 
minimised. This goal is likely to be achieved by developing a more detailed 
understanding of the biological and psychological processes underlying 
addictive behaviour. A key aim is to improve our understanding of the 
psychological strategies that enhance the ability of the individual to control 
craving of a substance (nicotine), which offers immediate positive and 
negative reinforcement but is associated with serious long-term health 
consequences.  
 
Craving 
Craving is considered in many of the major models of addition 
(Skinner & Aubin, 2010), although it has only recently been added as a 
criterion within substance-use disorders within the recent edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013).  Conditioning models of addiction argue that cue-induced 
craving occurs for those trying to quit and experiencing withdrawal symptoms 
(Drummond, 2000).  Cognitive models of craving posit that craving arises 
from a combination of socially learnt processes (such as self-efficacy) and 
cognitive elements such as memory and information processing (Tiffany, 
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1999).  According to this latter model, craving is the result of non-automatic 
processes (e.g. a decision to not smoke) clashing with an automatic process 
(e.g. habit-based action-tendencies involved in smoking behaviour) (Tiffany, 
1990).  Thus given its role in maintaining addictions, craving is an important 
target for intervention in addictive disorders (Tiffany & Wray, 2012).  
Several studies have demonstrated the link between craving and 
cigarette smoking. Ecological momentary assessment (EMA) studies have 
found that smoking urges are strongly linked to smoking behaviours 
(Shiffman et al., 2002), and are the strongest predictor of smoking behaviour 
(Cronk & Piasecki, 2010).  Smokers in this latter study reported smoking in 
order to manage their cravings, implying a potential vicious cycle of 
behaviour.  Higher craving has been associated with a higher probability of 
smoking, a shorter latency to smoke and greater number of cigarettes 
(Shiffman et al., 2013).   Thus craving is associated with higher levels of 
smoking, but has also been implicated in relapse in smokers attempting to quit 
(Killen & Fortmann, 1997; Van Zundert, Ferguson, Shiffman, & Engels, 
2012).  Further, experiencing intrusive thoughts about smoking has been 
shown to be linked both to “slips” during cessation attempts, and urges to 
smoke (Ginex & O'Connell, 2010), suggesting that addressing cognitive 
processes linked to craving is also important. 
 
Craving regulation strategies 
Psychological interventions in substance misuse form an important 
part of supporting those who are attempting to quit, for example through 
application of cognitive-behavioural principles (Miller & Brown, 2009).  One 
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psychological approach based on these principles is Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 2011).  There is 
promising evidence of effectiveness of ACT interventions for smoking, 
compared to medication (Gifford et al., 2004) and as an adjunct to medication 
(Gifford et al., 2011).  ACT appears to be more effective than traditional 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) approaches to smoking cessation 
(Bricker, Bush, Zbikowski, Mercer, & Heffner, 2014) and government-
recommended cessation support (Bricker, Mull, et al., 2014; Bricker, 
Wyszynski, Comstock, & Heffner, 2013).   
Experimental studies have investigated specific cognitive techniques 
for regulating cravings in smoking.   For example, considering the long-term 
consequences of smoking results in lower craving levels compared to thinking 
about short-term consequences (Kober, Kross, Mischel, Hart, & Ochsner, 
2010).  Szasz and colleagues (Szasz, Szentagotai, & Hofmann, 2012) 
compared the effect of suppression of thoughts relating to craving cigarettes, 
reappraisal of such thoughts in line with traditional CBT techniques or 
“acceptance” of craving and smoking thoughts in line with ACT techniques.  
Their study found that reappraisal of thoughts was more effective than the 
other two techniques in regulating craving, suggesting that the process of 
“accepting” thoughts does not have as great an effect as changing their 
meaning.  However, the instructions used by Szasz and colleagues only briefly 
describe the acceptance task, generating concerns that participants would not 
have had enough context to understand the instructions.  Indeed, in a recent 
meta-analysis, Levin and colleagues (Levin, Hildebrandt, Lillis, & Hayes, 
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2012) argue that experimental interventions which include an experiential 
element as well as a rationale are associated with greater effect sizes.   
Another core process within the ACT model may be more amenable to 
introducing in a short-term experimental setting.  “Defusion” describes a state 
in which clients are able to notice their thinking for what it is - the habitual, 
verbal and imaginal activity of the brain - rather than necessarily 
representations of facts or truth.  In the state of “cognitive fusion” there is a 
strong link between (verbal and imaginal) thought and action. Behaviour is 
thus regulated primarily by thought, without input from other sources, e.g. a 
desire to quit smoking to improve health.  Defusion techniques are designed to 
weaken the link between thought and automatic action, and can be introduced 
via simple instructions involving basic verbal or imaginal strategies (Hayes et 
al., 2011). Both defusion and acceptance strategies act as a counterpoint to 
“experiential avoidance,” which has been shown to be an important mediating 
factor in addictive disorders (Kingston, Clarke, & Remington, 2010).  
 
Mental imagery 
As noted above, thinking can be experienced as verbal, or as imaginal, 
i.e. in the form of mental images.  Mental imagery is the experience of “seeing 
with the mind’s eye” for example, with perceptual information coming from 
memory rather than direct sensory experiences (Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 
2001).  Research has explored the experience of mental imagery in cravings in 
food-related craving for example (e.g. Bullins et al., 2013). There is evidence 
for mental imagery playing a role in addiction-related processes, e.g. in 
promoting alcohol consumption (Connor et al., 2014; Kavanagh, May, & 
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Andrade, 2009), and some similar evidence in opiate addiction (Bradley & 
Moorey, 1988).   Research within smoking is limited, but smokers report both 
smoking related verbal thoughts and mental images (Salkovskis & Reynolds, 
1994). Further, smoking imagery scripts intended to prime urges and negative 
affect have been shown to be effective in increasing urges and decreasing 
affect (Maude-Griffin & Tiffany, 1996; Tiffany & Drobes, 1990). 
Further, mental imagery has a greater emotional impact than verbal 
thoughts (Holmes & Mathews, 2005; Holmes, Mathews, Mackintosh, & 
Dalgleish, 2008; Mathews, Ridgeway, & Holmes, 2013).  Thus there may be 
an increased impact of addressing mental imagery experienced in craving in 
smoking. Negative affect has been associated with increased “approach” 
behaviours, e.g. smoking, whereas positive affect has been linked to higher 
levels of “avoidance” behaviour e.g. not smoking (Schlauch, Gwynn-Shapiro, 
Stasiewicz, Molnar, & Lang, 2013).  
Thus, imagery appears to be an important part of the experience of 
craving (May, Andrade, Panabokke, & Kavanagh, 2004).  Andrade and 
colleagues have proposed the Elaborated Intrusion Theory of Desire, an 
account that draws heavily on cognitive understandings of cravings and 
emphasises the role of mental imagery (Andrade, May, & Kavanagh, 2012; 
Kavanagh, Andrade, & May, 2005; May, Kavanagh, & Andrade, 2015). 
Cravings are argued to be in the form of intrusive thoughts or images that are 
then elaborated, often with imagery (Kavanagh et al., 2005), an elaboration 
which is argued to use the visuospatial sketch-pad, a sub-system of working 
memory (VSSP; Baddeley, 1986).  
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Support for these predictions has been obtained through studies using 
visuo-spatial tasks which disrupt cravings, e.g. experimentally-induced food 
cravings (Andrade, Pears, May, & Kavanagh, 2012) and naturally occurring 
cravings for e.g. food, caffeine or nicotine (Skorka-Brown, Andrade, & May, 
2014).  Smokers who created mental visual imagery of neutral scenes or 
objects, such as a rose-garden or rainbow, reported reduced levels of craving, 
compared to those creating neutral auditory imagery (May, Andrade, 
Panabokke, & Kavanagh, 2010).  These results replicate and extend those 
found by Versland and Rosenberg (2007) who found that guided imagery was 
superior in reducing craving compared to a distracting cognitive verbal task.  
Another conceptualisation of the relationship between craving and 
imagery is offered using an Acceptance and Commitment Therapy 
formulation.  In this account, cognitive fusion to craving-related thoughts in 
addictive disorders is likely to reflect fusion to vivid and elaborated imagery. 
Further, as imagery is likely to be more affect-provoking than verbal thoughts, 
defusion from this imagery is likely to decrease affect, perhaps through an 
increase in distress tolerance, in which unpleasant affect can be endured in the 
pursuit of a broader behavioural goal (Brown, Lejuez, Kahler, Strong, & 
Zvolensky, 2005).  An increased willingness to stay in contact with aversive 
experiences is a key tenet of ACT, and may paradoxically have the effect of 
reducing their unpleasant affective properties (Harris, 2009).   Further, 
repeated practice of a defusion technique over time should increase 
experiential understanding and thus increase in effectiveness. 
The current randomised experimental study compared the effectiveness 
of a “defusion-from-imagery’ strategy and a standard imagery replacement 
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procedure on cravings for cigarettes and smoking-related behaviour (cigarettes 
smoked and approach-avoidance behaviour in a stimulus-response 
compatibility task) in non-treatment-seeking smokers with a degree of 
motivation to quit.  As the strategies focus on the idiosyncratic mental imagery 
experienced by smokers, rather than using an imagery induction script 
(Maude-Griffin & Tiffany, 1996; Tiffany & Drobes, 1990), a novel imagery 
cue-induction, tailored to participants' idiosyncratic smoking-related imagery, 
was used to induce craving.  This was followed by the use of one of the two 
craving regulation strategies.   
The main study hypothesis was that the defusion from imagery 
strategy would be associated with reduced experiential avoidance of smoking-
related experiences that would be at least equally effective in reducing 
smoking craving compared to an alternative imagery condition (Beadman et 
al., 2015).  A second exploratory hypothesis was that the defusion strategy 
would produce a significantly greater reduction in negative affect, in line with 
an increase in distress tolerance, compared to the alternative imagery.   An 
additional exploratory hypothesis was that use of the defusion strategy over a 
7 day period would have a greater effect on reducing craving and number of 
cigarettes smoked compared to the alternative imagery strategy as participants 
gain familiarity with a strategy that involves relating to their thoughts in an 
unfamiliar way (unlike, perhaps, the imagery replacement strategy).  
 
Method 
 
Research design 
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This study used a between–groups design.  The original design 
contained three conditions: “suppression,” defusion and imagery replacement 
(“alternative imagery”). However due to recruitment difficulties, a decision 
was made at an early stage to concentrate recruitment efforts on the two 
conditions that seemed most closely matched (only 2 participants were 
recruited to the suppression condition). The remainder of this section therefore 
only outlines the methodology as it relates to the latter two conditions.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental 
conditions: Alternative Imagery or Defusion. The experimenter was blind to 
condition until after the pre-task questionnaires had been completed, after 
which, participant allocation to group was determined according to a random 
code contained in a sealed manilla envelope which was prepared by the 
research supervisor.   
 
Participants 
Participants were recruited through posters and websites such as 
Gumtree and Facebook in two locations, London and Cambridge.  Of 319 who 
replied to advertisements, 67 were identified as eligible (see Figure 1).  Of 
these, 50 attended their initial study appointment and gave informed consent.  
45 provided 24 hour follow-up data, and 36 provided 7 day follow-up data. 
Inclusion criteria for participants were: 18-60 years old, fluency in 
English, smoking at least five cigarettes a day, a score of  ≥4 on the 
Fagerstrom Test of Nicotine Dependence (i.e. at least mild dependence) and 
≥4 on the Motivation to Stop Smoking scale (which indicated a strong desire 
to stop smoking).  Exclusion criteria included current mental health problems, 
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current psychotropic medication use, current addiction to a substance other 
than nicotine, enrolment on a structured smoking cessation programme and 
use of nicotine replacement therapy for smoking cessation. 
Power analysis for this study was informed by previous work within 
craving reduction.  For example, Szasz and colleagues (Szasz et al., 2012) 
found an effect size of p2 =0.13 (medium-large effect size).  However, as no 
work within smoking imagery has been conducted previously, sample size was 
estimated using a more conservative small-medium effect size.   Assuming 
equal group sizes, power calculation was carried out using “G*Power 3” 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), with alpha specified at 5% and 
power at 80%.  The sample reported in this study of N = 24 in two groups 
would have the power to detect a small-medium effect size of f =0.21. 
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Figure 1. Recruitment flow diagram. 
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Ethics 
This study received ethical approval from the UCL Research Ethics 
Committee (Project ID Number: 0760/002) and is part of a wider research 
programme on the effects of visuo-spatial tasks on smoking and drinking (see  
Appendices 2-3). 
 
Measures 
 
Smoking-related measures. 
Motivation to Stop Smoking Scale (MTSS; Kotz, Brown, & West, 2013).  
The MTSS measures motivation to stop smoking on a seven-point scale.  Each 
point is anchored to statements relating to increasing levels of motivation, 
from 1 (“I don’t want to stop smoking”) to 7 (“I REALLY want to stop 
smoking and intend to in the next month”).   This measure shows good 
predictive validity and acceptable accuracy (ROCAUC = 0.67 [95% CI = 0.65–
0.70]) in identifying smokers who quit.   
 
Fagerstrom Test of Nicotine Dependence (FTND; Heatherton, Kozlowski, 
Frecker, & Fagerstrom, 1991).  The FTND is a six-item measure of smoking 
behaviours (e.g. latency to first cigarette after waking) with a maximum 
possible score of 10.  Higher scores indicate higher levels of nicotine 
dependence.  This widely-used measure has acceptable internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .61). 
 
  
 96 
Timeline Follow Back Instrument (TLFB; Sobell & Sobell, 1992; Sobell & 
Sobell, 1996).  The TLFB (adapted for cigarettes) is a self-report calendar-
based retrospective method for estimating number of cigarettes smoked. In 
this study, participants reported numbers for either the preceding seven days, 
providing a daily mean, or twenty-four hours.  The TLFB has been shown to 
have a good correlation (r = 0.85) with other methods of assessing number of 
cigarettes smoked (e.g. Gariti, Alterman, Ehrman, & Pettinati, 1998) and 
excellent (r = 0.73-0.93) test-retest reliability in cigarette smokers (Robinson, 
Sobell, Sobell, & Leo, 2014). 
 
Mood and Physical Symptoms Scale (MPSS; West & Hajek, 2004).  The 
MPSS measures five withdrawal symptoms (depression, irritability, 
restlessness, hunger and poor concentration) on a 5-point Likert scale (1= 
“Not at all”, 5 = “Extremely”).  It also includes two 6-point urge scales 
measuring strength of urges (0= “No urges”, 5 = “Extremely strong”), and 
time spent with urges to smoke (0= “Not at all”, 5 = “All of the time”).  These 
are averaged to provide a single urge score.  In this study, the urge items of the 
MPSS was anchored at either “the past eight hours or since waking” or “the 
past few minutes,” however this data were part of a separate validation study 
and are therefore not reported here.  The MPSS has good internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .78).  
 
Brief Questionnaire of Smoking Urges (QSU-brief; Cox, Tiffany, & 
Christen, 2001). The QSU-brief is a ten-item measure of current craving, e.g. 
“I would do anything for a cigarette right now.”  Items are rated on a seven 
  
 97 
point Likert scale (1 = “Strongly disagree” to 7 = “Strongly agree”), with a 
maximum possible score of 70.  It has excellent internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alpha= 0.97). 
 
Trait measures. 
Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale (SUIS; Reisberg, Pearson, & Kosslyn, 
2003).  The SUIS is a twelve-item measure of spontaneous use of mental 
imagery in everyday settings.  Items (e.g. “When I first hear a friend's voice, a 
visual image of him or her almost always springs to mind”) are rated on a five 
point Likert scale (from 1 = “Never”, 5 = “Always”). The mean score is 
reported.  The SUIS has acceptable reliability (Cronbach’s alpha= 0.72-76; 
Nelis, Holmes, Griffith, & Raes, 2014) and is correlated with other measures 
of vividness such as the Vividness of Visual Imagery questionnaire (Marks, 
1973) providing convergent validity. 
 
White Bear Suppression Inventory – Smoking Version (WBSI-S; Nosen & 
Woody, 2013). The WBSI-S measures tendency to suppress thoughts of 
smoking.  Using a 5 point Likert scale (1= “Strongly disagree, 5 = “Strongly 
agree”), participants rate ten items (e.g. “I tried not to think about smoking”), 
with a total possible score of 50.  It has strong internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.81) and good convergent and discriminant validity with 
other measures of suppression (Nosen & Woody, 2013).  
 
Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire (CFQ; Gillanders et al., 2014).  The CFQ is 
a measure of tendency to experience fusion with thoughts.  Participants rate 7 
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items (e.g. “I tend to get very entangled in my thoughts”) using a seven-point 
Likert Scale (from 1 = “Never true”, 7 = “Always true”).  It has excellent 
internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.88) and good test-retest reliability 
(r = .81). 
 
National Adult Reading Test (NART; Nelson, 1982). The NART is a 
commonly used proxy measure of premorbid IQ.  Participants are presented 
with fifty irregularly spelt words (e.g. “Gaoled”) and asked to read them 
aloud.  Error scores are recorded, and converted (127.7 – 0.826 × NART error 
score) into an estimated Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Revised Full 
Scale IQ score (WAIS-R; Wechsler, 1981). 
 
State measures. 
International Positive and Negative Affect Schedule Short Form (IPANAS-
SF; Thompson, 2007).  This ten item measure asks participants to rate five 
negative and five positive items (e.g. “upset”, “inspired”) on a five-point 
Likert scale (1 = “not at all,” 5 = “very much), providing a negative and 
positive affect score; each subscale has a total possible score of 25.  The 
IPANAS-SF has been shown to have good internal consistency (Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.87) and good convergent and discriminant relationships with longer, 
validated measures of mood. 
 
Avoidance and Inflexibility Scale (AIS; Gifford et al., 2004; Gifford et al., 
2011). The AIS is a thirteen-item measure of experiential avoidance linked to 
smoking.  Using five point Likert scales (1= “not at all”, 5 = “very 
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likely/much”), participants rate how likely their smoking-related thoughts, 
feelings and bodily sensations are to lead them to smoke, and aspects of their 
experience (e.g. “How much are you struggling to control these feelings?”).  
The mean score is reported.  For this study, the scale was amended to replace 
“thoughts” with “mental images.”   The AIS has excellent internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.93). 
  
Imagery questionnaire. Participants were asked to rate how vivid, pleasant, 
compelling and unwanted their smoking mental imagery was on seven-point 
Likert scales, ranging from 1 ("not at all") to 7 ("extremely").   An additional 
item measured the extent of mind-wandering using this seven point scale. 
 They indicated from which perspective they experienced their mental imagery 
(first/third/mixture of both) and the content of any verbal thoughts noticed 
during the imagery exercise (see Appendix 7.) 
  
Credibility and manipulation checks. 
Credibility and Expectancy Questionnaire (CEQ; Devilly & Borkovec, 
2000).  The CEQ is a six-item measure which asks participants to rate 
statements on nine-point Likert scales (1= “Not at all” to 9 = “Very”; items 1-
3 and 5) or from 0-100% (items 4 and 6). The scale was adapted for this study 
to reflect instructions relating to smoking/cravings e.g. “At this point, how 
successful do you think these instructions will be in reducing your cravings?” 
and items 4 and 6 were standardized to a nine-point Likert scale.  A credibility 
score is calculated from the mean of items 1-3, and an expectancy score from 
the mean of items 4-6. 
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Comprehension and manipulation checks.  Participants were presented with 
six questions to check their understanding of and engagement with the 
strategy.  The first three questions related to general use of the strategy and 
were scored on seven-point Likert scales; how complicated were the 
instructions (1 = “Not at all complicated” to 7 = “Very complicated”), how 
clearly did you understand the instructions (1 = “Understood completely” to 7 
= “Did not understand at all”) and prior use of the strategy (1 = “Never” to 7 = 
“All the time”).  As these three questions were introduced later in the study, 
data is absent for the first six participants.  The next three questions, answered 
by all, asked the extent to which participants tried to “replace” their image 
with a different image, to “get distance” from their image, or to “erase” their 
image, rated on seven-point Likert scales (1= “Not al all” to 7 = “Extremely”). 
 
Craving regulation tasks.   
For the imagery defusion condition, a novel craving regulation task 
was designed, based on and adapted from that reported by Beadman and 
colleagues (Beadman et al., 2015). The task consists of three sections (an 
introduction regarding imagery, an explanation of the strategy and an active 
strategy use section).  Equivalent instructions were also designed for the 
Alternative Imagery condition. 
The instructions for the two conditions were matched for length, 
smoking and emotion related words, Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level and Reading 
Ease.  Further, each condition was matched as closely as possible word for 
word (see Appendices 8-13 for full instructions).  Instructions were given to 
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participants in printed form and were also presented in audio format, recorded 
by a non-psychologist volunteer blind to hypotheses who rated all instructions 
as equally credible as rated by the CEQ.  
The first section is an introductory rationale on links between visual 
mental imagery and smoking.  The second section of the task is an explanation 
of the strategy and a brief instructional practice of the strategy.  In the third 
section, participants following only audio-recorded instructions, complete the 
imagery cue-induction, and then practice using the strategy over a two-minute 
period. Compliance is assessed verbally.  Participants who indicate they have 
not understood or who have completed the task in an idiosyncratic manner are 
provided with clarification and asked to follow the strategy as described in the 
printed/recorded instructions.  Participants then repeat the imagery cue-
induction and complete the main task of using their strategy.  
 
Imagery cue-induction task. 
Initially, participants are asked to focus on their craving experiences 
and report if any spontaneous mental imagery relating to smoking comes to 
mind.  Those who do not experience spontaneous imagery are asked to create 
a scenario in mental imagery of a situation in which they have a strong urge to 
smoke and can smoke. For the imagery-cue induction, participants are asked 
to close their eyes and immerse themselves in their smoking imagery for two 
minutes, with instructions to return to the smoking imagery if they noticed 
their mind had wandered. 
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Stimulus-response compatibility task  
The SRC task was based on that described by Mogg et al (Mogg, 
Bradley, Field, & De Houwer, 2003) and was programmed in Experiment 
Builder (SR Research Experiment Builder 1.10.165, 2011). A manikin is 
presented on a computer screen above or below either neutral or smoking 
images and participants are required to move the manikin towards or away 
from the images.  “Toward” or “away” moves relate to symbolic behavioural 
approach or avoidance tendencies and provides an implicit measure of 
affective or motivational valence of smoking stimuli (Mogg et al., 2003).  Two 
blocks, each with 20 practice trials and 80 experimental trials, are presented; 
in one block participants must approach smoking-images and avoid neutral 
images, in the other, the order is reversed.  Blocks were presented in a 
counterbalanced order.  10 smoking and 10 neutral images were presented 5 
times each in each block (see Appendix 14); the manikin was presented an 
equal number of times above and below the image and the order of trials was 
randomised.  Latency to respond (response time) is recorded in addition to 
whether the initial response was correct (regardless of subsequent self-
correction).  
 
Procedure 
Participants were screened for eligibility via a telephone interview; if 
eligible, they asked to refrain from smoking for two hours before study 
participation.  Written informed consent was obtained. 
Participants completed the MPSS (with urges anchored at “past eight 
hours or since waking”) and provided socio-demographic and smoking history 
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information. CO levels were measured to determine compliance with the 2 hr 
abstinence instructions, and latency since last cigarette recorded.   After 
completion of the NART, SUIS, WBSI-S and CFQ, baseline measures of 
craving and mood were taken (QSU-brief, MPSS Urge frequency and 
strength, IPANAS). 
Following the introductory rationale regarding mental imagery and 
smoking, participants then completed the craving cue induction, followed by 
the QSU-brief, MPSS urge frequency and strength (“past few minutes”), 
IPANAS, and the questionnaire about their mental imagery.  The craving 
regulation task was then completed, with the CEQ administered following the 
second section of the task (strategy explanation).   
Post-craving regulation strategy measures were then completed: QSU-
brief, MPSS urge frequency and strength (“past few minutes”), IPANAS, the 
questionnaire about their mental imagery and the Avoidance and Inflexibility 
Scale.   Finally, participants completed the SRC task. 
Participants were then asked to practice their assigned strategy over the 
course of 7 days; a cue-card was given with a reminder of strategy (see 
Appendix 15).  Strategy use, helpfulness, intention to continue use, current 
craving, latency since last cigarette and number of cigarettes smoked since the 
study (QSU-brief, MPSS urge frequency and strength “in past 8 hours/since 
waking”, TLFB) were assessed via telephone interview at 24 hours and 7 day 
follow-up.  
 
Statistical analysis 
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Mixed within-between subjects analyses of variance (ANOVA) will be 
conducted to examine changes in score over time and between groups.  
Planned contrasts will be Bonferoni corrected.  Current craving measures pre- 
and post-imagery cue induction and post–strategy use will be compared using  
repeated mixed ANOVAs and t-tests to establish whether craving rose as a 
result of the cue-induction, and fell as a result of strategy use.   
Data found to have a non-normal distribution (through visual 
inspection of histograms, calculation of skewness and kurtosis and 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests) will be either analysed using non-parametric tests 
(with medians reported) or data will be log-transformed.  Figures will display 
non-transformed data.  All analyses will be conducted using SPSS Version 22 
(IBM Corp, Released 2013).  The two participants recruited into the 
Suppression condition will be excluded from the analyses. 
 
Results 
 
Descriptive statistics 
48 participants (age M = 30.48, SD = 10.94; 73% male; 75% White, 
18.8% Asian, 6.2% all other) were included in the analysis. There were no 
differences between groups on any demographic or smoking baseline 
variables, or trait measures; see Table 1. There were no differences between 
Cambridge and London participants on any baseline measures (all ps >.1, 
except for more pre-rolled cigarettes in the London group, X2 (2, N = 48) = 
5.98, p = 0.05). One participant provided no 24 hour data, but did provide 7 
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day follow-up data.  This is reflected in the differing degrees of freedom 
reported below. 
 
Table 1. 
Demographics and Trait Measures 
 
 Alternative Imagery  Defusion  
 n = 24 n = 24 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Age 32.25 (11.07) 28.71 (10.75) 
Years of education 15.33 (2.26) 14.29 (2.16) 
WAIS FSIQ 103.46 (9.74) 99.08 (7.31) 
SUIS 3.35 (0.73) 3.33 (0.59) 
WBSI-SV 37.17 (7.58) 33.92 (7.91) 
CFQ 28.38 (8.18) 27.33 (9.91) 
 N (%)  N (%) 
Gender   
Male 18 (75) 17 (70.8) 
Female 6 (25) 7 (29.2) 
Ethnicity   
White 20 (83.3) 16 (66.7) 
Asian/Asian British 3 (12.5) 6 (25) 
Mixed/Multiple Ethnic Groups 1 (4.2) 0 
Black/Black British 0 1 (4.2) 
Note. WAIS, Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale; FSIQ, Full Scale IQ; SUIS, Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale; 
WBSI-SV, White Bear Suppression Inventory- Smoking Version; CFQ, Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire 
* No difference between groups, all ps ≥ .09 
 
 
Smoking baseline characteristics 
Of the 48 participants, 37.5% (N = 18) smoked pre-rolled cigarettes, 
54.2% (N = 26) smoked hand-rolled cigarettes and 8.3% (N = 4) smoked both; 
there were no differences between groups, X2 (2, N = 48) = 1.15, p = .56.  The 
groups did not differ on CO level (Alternative Imagery M = 8.00, SD = 3.01, 
Defusion M = 7.33, SD = 2.82, t(46)= .79, p = .43, d = .23) or on any baseline 
or smoking history variables (see Table 2). 
 
Table  2.   
Baseline smoking variables and smoking history  
 Alternative Imagery  Defusion  
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
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MTSS 5.21 (1.14) 5.13 (1.00) 
FTND 5.29 (1.04) 5.33 (1.31) 
Mean daily cigarettes 
(TLFB) 
13.49 (5.34) 14.15 (6.60) 
MPSS Withdrawal  9.71 (3.00) 9.50 (2.70) 
MPSS Urge 2.40 (0.83) 2.69 (0.84) 
Years smoked 15.08 (10.22) 11.68 (9.85) 
Years smoked 5+ cigarettes 13.42 (9.87) 9.62 (8.97) 
Number of quit attempts** 5.95 (10.42) 5.21 (5.15) 
Maximum time not 
smoking (months) ** 
5.43 (7.53) 4.38 (6.74) 
Note. MTSS, Motivation to Stop Smoking Scale; FTND, Fagerstrom Test for Nicotine Dependence; TLFB, Timeline 
Follow Back Instrument; MPSS; Mood and Physical Symptoms Scale. 
*No difference between groups, all ps ≥.10 
** Alternative Imagery n = 21, Defusion n = 19. 
 
Imagery-cue induction 
58.3% (N = 28) participants reported spontaneous imagery while 
craving; there was no differences between groups, X2 (1, N = 48) = .34, p = 
.77.  All participants were able to identify imagery relating to smoking, and 
these did not differ on imagery characteristics reported below (e.g. vividness, 
all ps ≥ .11).   
 
Manipulation check and compliance 
Following the compliance check, N = 6 per group required the 
instructions clarifying.  As expected, participants in the Alternative Imagery 
condition scored higher on the item relating to “replacing your smoking 
image” (M = 5.67, SD = 1.34) compared to those in the Defusion group (M = 
3.5, SD = 1.95), t(46) = 4.48, p > 0.001, d = 1.53.  Additionally, those in the 
Defusion group scored higher on the item relating to “getting distance from 
your smoking image” (M = 5.33, SD = 1.31) compared to those in the 
Alternative Imagery group (M = 4.17, SD = 1.88), t(46) = -2.50, p = .02, d = 
1.24.  There was no difference between groups on the “suppression” item, p 
>.9. 
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Credibility and use of strategy  
Independent samples t-tests and Mann-Whitney tests showed that there 
were no differences in strategy credibility, expectancy, how complicated their 
instructions were deemed to be or how clearly they were understood, (all t 
values ≥ -.32, U values ≥ 211, ps ≥.75).  There was, however, a difference 
between groups regarding prior use, Mann-Whitney U = 145, p = .01, r = .41, 
with the Alternative Imagery group more likely to report having used their 
strategy before. 
 
Craving 
A mixed between-within subjects ANOVA was conducted to assess 
the impact of strategy on craving as measured by QSU-brief over three time 
points (baseline, post imagery cue-induction, post-strategy use). There was a 
main effect of condition F(1, 46) = 5.00, p = .03, p2 = .10, with the Defusion 
group reporting higher craving across time points (see Figure 2).  There was a 
significant main effect of Time, F(2, 92) = 18.86, p > .001, p2 = .29. 
Contrasts revealed a significant increase from baseline to post cue-induction, 
F(1, 46) = 5.09, p = .03, p2 = .10, indicating that the cue-induction had 
successfully raised craving levels.  There was also a significant decrease from 
post imagery cue-induction to post-strategy use, F(1, 46) = 33.86, p > .001, 
p2 = .42. The groups did not differ in the level of increase or decrease in 
craving over Time as there was no interaction effect, F(2, 92) = .67, p = .52, 
p2 = .01.  
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Figure 2. Mean QSU-brief scores (with standard error bars) between groups 
within session. 
 
35 participants provided follow-up data at both 24 hour and 7 day 
follow-up. As the data at both 24 hour and 7 day follow-up was not normally 
distributed, all data was log transformed. To investigate whether craving 
levels continued to fall following strategy use for these participants, a 2 
(Condition) x 5 (Time) mixed within-between subjects ANOVA was 
conducted. There was a significant main effect of Condition F(1, 33) = 4.86, p 
= .035, p2 = .13, with the Defusion group reporting higher craving scores at 
all time points.  There was a significant main effect of Time on urge score, 
F(4, 132) = 27.52, p > .001, p2 = .46. Contrasts revealed a significant 
decrease from post-strategy use to 24 hour follow-up, F(1, 33) = 11.88, p = 
.002, p2 = .27.  There was no difference between 24 hour and 7 day follow-up 
craving score F(1, 33) = 2.61, p = .12, p2 = .07, indicating craving levels 
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stayed low (see Figure 3).  There was no interaction effect, F(24 132) = .40, p 
= .81, p2 = .01. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean QSU-brief scores (with standard error bars) between groups 
over time. 
 
Negative and positive affect  
A mixed between-within subjects ANOVA was conducted to assess 
the impact of condition on positive and negative affect as measured by 
IPANAS-SF at three time points (baseline, post-imagery cue-induction, post-
strategy use).  Scores on the negative scale were log-transformed due to non-
normal distribution. There was no main effect of Condition for negative affect, 
F(1, 46) = .40, p = .53, p2  = .01.  There was a significant main effect of Time 
on negative affect, F(2, 92) = 8.41, p > .001, p2 = .16. Contrasts revealed a 
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significant increase from baseline to post-imagery cue-induction, F(1, 46) = 
5.63, p = .02, p2 = .11, and a significant decrease from post imagery cue-
induction to post-strategy use, F(1, 46) = 13.32, p > .001, p2 = .23. There was 
no interaction effect between Condition and Time, F(2, 92) = .76, p = .47, p2 
= .02. 
There was no main effect of either Condition F(1, 46) = .004, p = .95, 
p2  > .001, or Time, F(2, 92) = 1.07, p = .35, p2 = .02, on positive affect.  
There was no interaction effect, F(2, 92) = 1.29, p = .28, p2 = .03. 
 
Smoking behaviour 
One participant had not smoked in the 24 hour period following the 
study, and therefore was coded as the maximum period i.e. 24 hours latency.  
There was no difference in latency to smoke between Distraction (Md = 109, 
N = 23) and Defusion (Md = 115, N = 22), Mann-Whitney U = 244, p = .84, r 
= -.03. 
Mean TLFB score for the week preceding the study, the total cigarettes 
smoked at 24 hour follow up and the daily mean TLFB at 7 day follow-up 
were used to assess change in smoking.  As the data for 24 hour and 7 day 
follow up were not normally distributed in the Defusion group, all data were 
log transformed. There was no main effect of Condition F(1, 33) = 1.19, p = 
.28, p2 = .04.  There was a significant main effect of Time on mean number of 
cigarettes smoked, F(2, 66) = 15.28, p > .001, p2 = .32. Contrasts revealed a 
significant decrease from pre-strategy to 24 hour follow-up, F(1, 33) = 11.88, 
p = .002, p2 = .27.  There was no difference between 24 hour and 7 day 
follow-up mean daily TLFB score, F(1, 33) = .35, p = .56, p2 = .01, indicating 
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the reduction of mean daily cigarettes was maintained.  There was no 
interaction effect, F(2, 66) = .40, p = .67, p2 = .01. 
 
Imagery characteristics following strategy use 
Mixed between-within subjects ANOVA tests were conducted to 
assess differences in imagery scores (vividness, pleasantness, unwantedness, 
compellingness and mind-wandering) between Conditions and over Time 
(pre- and post-strategy use).   
For vividness scores, there was no main effect of Time F(1, 46) = .99, 
p = .32, p2 = .02 or of Condition F(1, 46) = 1.97, p = .17, p2 = .04. There 
was no interaction effect of Time and Condition, F(1, 46) = .35, p = .56, p2 = 
.01, For scores of how unwanted the imagery was, there was no main effect of 
Time, F(1, 46) = 2.06, p = .16, p2 = .04 or of Condition, F(1, 46) = .14, p = 
.72, p2 = .003, and no interaction effect of Time and Condition, F(1, 46) = 
2.06, p = .16, p2 = .04. 
For pleasantness scores, there was no main effect of Time, F(1, 46) = 
3.00, p = .09, p2 = .06) or of Condition, F(1, 46) = .52, p = .48, p2= .01. 
There was, however, a marginal interaction between Time and Condition, F(1, 
46) = 3.92, p = .05, p2 = .08.  Figure 4 suggests that this effect is accounted 
for by a decrease in pleasantness ratings over time in the Defusion group. 
Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons were conducted, revealing a 
significant reduction in pleasantness score in the Defusion group, from pre- to 
post-strategy use, t(23) = 2.63, p =.01, d = .58 . 
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Figure 4. Mean pleasantness of imagery scores between groups at pre- and 
post strategy use. 
 
For compellingness scores, there was no main effect of Time F(1, 46) 
= 1.56, p = .22, p2 = .03 and no main effect of Condition F(1, 46) = .1.48, p = 
.23, p2 = .03.  However, there was a trend interaction effect of Time and 
Condition, F(1, 46) = 3.52, p = .07, p2 = .07; the Defusion group rated their 
imagery as less compelling on the second occasion compared to the 
Alternative Imagery group.  Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons were 
conducted, revealing a significant reduction in compellingness score in the 
Defusion group, from pre- (M = 4.54, SD = 1.06) to post-strategy (M = 3.92, 
SD = 1.14), t(23) = 2.21 p =.03, d = .56.  There was no difference in the 
Alternative Imagery group, p = .86.   
For mind-wandering scores, there was no main effect of Condition, 
F(1, 46) = 6.44, p = .37, p2 = .02 and no interaction effect of Time and 
Condition, F(1, 46) = .13, p = .72, p2 = .003.  However, there was a main 
effect of Time, F(1, 46) = .99, p = .02, p2 = .12, i.e. both groups reported 
increased mind-wandering over time. 
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Imagery perspective and verbal thoughts 
Imagery perspective was assessed twice, post-imagery cue-induction 
and post- strategy.  Post-imagery cue-induction, 46% (N = 22) reported a first 
person perspective, 29% (N = 14) a third person, and 25% (N = 12) a mixture 
of both.  Post- strategy use, 58% (N = 28) reported a first person perspective, 
27% (N = 13) a third person, and 15% (N = 7) a mixture of both.  There were 
no differences between groups on the visual perspective reported in the 
imagery post-induction, X2 (2, N = 48) = .52, p = .77 and post-strategy use, X2 
(2, N = 48) = .22, p = .90. 
Verbal thoughts were reported during the first (N =16) and second (N = 
7) imagery cue-induction; there were with no differences between groups, X2 
≤ .17, ps ≥ .54 
 
Experiential avoidance 
There was no difference between Alternative Imagery and Defusion on 
mean scores of the AIS, which was assessed post-strategy use (Alternative 
Imagery M = 3.55, SD = .63, Defusion M = 3.42, SD = .74), t(46) = .94, p = 
.52, d = 1.18.  
 
Strategy use at Follow-up 
            At 24 hour follow-up, there was no difference in the time since last 
cigarette smoked between Alternative Imagery (Md = 82.5, N = 24) and 
Defusion (Md = 30, N = 21), Mann-Whitney U = 188.5, p = .15, r = -.22.  
There was also no difference in frequency of strategy-use between groups, X2 
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(1, N = 45) = .37, p = .55, or in the amount strategy was used (Alternative 
Imagery M = 3.58, SD = 1.38, Defusion M = 3.19, SD = 1.43), t(43) = .94, p = 
.35, d = 0.89.  For those who reported using the strategy, there was no 
difference in how helpful they found it, (Alternative Imagery M = 4.90, SD = 
1.22, Defusion M = 4.47, SD = 1.59), t(43) = .95, p = .35, d = 1.10.  There was 
no difference between groups regarding intention to use the strategy in the 
future, Alternative Imagery Md = 1, N = 24, Defusion Md = 3, N = 21, Mann-
Whitney U = 182, p = .09, r = -.15. 
At 7 day follow up, there was no difference in the time (minutes) since 
last cigarette smoked between Alternative Imagery (Md = 75, N = 20) and 
Defusion (Md = 60, N = 16), Mann-Whitney U = 135, p = .44, r = -.33.  There 
was also no difference in strategy use between groups, X2 (1, N =36) = 1.69, p 
= .19, or in the amount strategy was used (Alternative Imagery M = 3.67, SD = 
1.18, Defusion M = 4.25, SD = 1.39), t(32) = -1.32, p = .20, d = 0.78.  
However, for those who reported using the strategy, there was a significant 
difference in how helpful they found it, (Alternative Imagery M = 4.83, SD = 
1.66, Defusion M = 3.75, SD = 1.34), t(32) = 2.08, p = .046, d = 1.13 (large 
effect size, Cohen, 1988).  Nonetheless, there was no difference in intention to 
use the strategy in the future, Alternative Imagery Md = 2, N = 20, Defusion 
Md = 1, N = 16, Mann-Whitney U = 151.50, p = .78, r = -.11, 
 
SRC 
Due to a technical fault, data from one participant (Defusion group) 
was not fully recorded, and therefore this participant was excluded from 
further analyses.  For response latency analysis, data from eight participants 
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(N = 6, Defusion group) were excluded due to high error rates for the first 
response (i.e. initial button press) (>23% of first responses incorrect; Mogg et 
al., 2003); thus data from 39 participants was analysed.  Analyses were also 
conducted with the full dataset; all ps were the same or decreased.  Initial 
response times (RTs) from the approach/avoidance task from correct trials 
were excluded if RTs were < 200ms (1% of data), or +/- 3 SDs from the mean 
for that condition (2% of data). 
 
Reaction time for correct responses. 
Approach/avoidance data were analysed using a 2 (Behaviour) × 2 
(Stimulus) × 2 (Condition) mixed ANOVA, with initial RT on the SRC task as 
the dependent variable, behaviour (approaching or avoiding stimuli) and 
stimulus (smoking-related or neutral images) as within-subject factors and 
condition as the between-subjects factor. Post-hoc pair-wise comparisons are 
reported as Bonferroni corrected t-tests. 
A main effect of Behaviour (approach, avoid) on RT was found, F(1, 
37) = 18.66, p > .001, p2 = .34, indicating participants were faster to approach 
stimuli than avoid them.  There was also a main effect of Stimulus, F(1, 37) = 
89.08, p > .001, p2 = .71, indicating faster response times to smoking images 
compared to neutral images, suggesting that both groups show a motivational 
bias towards smoking images, as expected.  There was a trend main effect of 
Condition on response time, F(1, 37) = 3.87, p = .057, p2 = .10, with those in 
the Defusion strategy group responding faster across behaviours and stimuli 
(see Figure 5). 
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A Condition x Stimulus interaction was also found, F(1, 37) = 5.19, p 
= .03, p2 = .12 such that participants in the Alternative Imagery group were 
slower to respond to neutral stimuli, compared to those in the Defusion group, 
t(37) = 2.07, p = .046, d = .67, however the groups did not differ in response 
times to smoking images, t(37) = 1.83, p = .08, d = .59 (see Figure 5). The 
Behaviour x Stimulus x Condition interaction did not reach significance, F(1, 
37) = 2.641, p = .11, p2 = .07 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Mean RTs (in ms with standard error bars) for Stimulus type 
(Smoking/Neutral) by group. 
 
Proportion of correct responses. 
All participants’ response data were analysed using a 2 
(Behaviour) × 2 (Stimulus) × 2 (Condition) mixed ANOVA, with initial 
response (correct/incorrect) on the SRC task as the dependent variable, 
behaviour (approaching or avoiding stimuli) and stimulus (smoking-related or 
neutral images) as within-subject factors and condition as the between-
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subjects factor. Post-hoc pair-wise comparisons are reported as Bonferroni 
corrected t-tests. 
There was no main effect of Behaviour, F(1, 45) = 2.95, p = .09, p2 = 
.06 and no main effect of Stimulus, F(1, 45) = .89, p = .35, p2 = .02. There 
was a Behaviour x Stimulus x Condition interaction, F(1, 45) = 4.72, p = .035, 
p2 = .10.  When the task was to approach, the Defusion group made the 
correct first response more to smoking than neutral images, t(22) = 2.33, p = 
.03, d = .47.   The opposite effect was found when the task was to avoid 
smoking, t(22) = 2.46, p = .02, d = .51, i.e. there were more incorrect first 
responses to smoking stimuli, indicating that the Defusion group demonstrated 
a greater automatic approach bias to smoking than the Distraction group (see 
Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 6. Proportion of correct responses (with standard error bars) for Task 
(Approach/Avoid) and Stimulus type (Smoking/Neutral) by group. 
 
There were, however, no correlations between craving at baseline, 
post-imagery cue-induction and post-strategy use and RTs or proportion of 
first correct response regardless of task or stimulus, all ps > .2.  There were 
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also no correlations between the AIS measure of experiential avoidance and 
RTs or proportion of first correct response, all ps > .39. 
 
Discussion 
This study aimed to investigate the impact of two experimental craving 
regulation strategies, Defusion and Alternative Imagery, on craving, affect and 
smoking-related behaviour. Both were associated with reduced craving over 
time, negative affect, and the number of cigarettes smoked. There was a 
reduction in how pleasant the Defusion group found their imagery following 
strategy use, and a trend reduction in how compelling they found it.  The 
stimulus-response compatibility task revealed a motivational bias towards 
smoking stimuli in the Defusion group in terms of first correct responses, but 
not for response times.  In addition, the Alternative Imagery group were 
slower to respond to neutral stimuli.  
Few studies have investigated mental imagery among smokers, and in 
this respect, the current study makes a preliminary novel contribution.  Over 
half of the sample in this study reported spontaneous visual mental imagery of 
smoking when asked to focus on their craving experiences.  This adds support 
to the argument that mental imagery plays a role in craving experiences for 
nicotine addiction, and that it represents an accessible potential target for 
intervention. The study also showed that a novel imagery-based cue-induction 
procedure, tailored to idiosyncratic smoking imagery, was effective in eliciting 
craving.  This has the advantage of greater ecological validity compared to 
script-base imagery cue-inductions (e.g. Maude-Griffin & Tiffany, 1996).  
Experimental cue-induced craving methods often use external stimuli to raise 
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craving, but this study shows that internal stimuli can also be elicited and 
elaborated to induce higher craving levels.  
As predicted, both craving regulation strategies were associated with a 
reduction in craving over time, and the mean number of cigarettes smoked at 7 
day follow-up.  However, unexpectedly there was no difference on a measure 
of experiential avoidance.  Although both strategies were as effective as each 
other on subjective measures, further conclusions must be limited due to the 
lack of a control condition (e.g. suppression or “no treatment”).  However, in 
similar research focusing on verbal thoughts, defusion and reappraisal were 
also found to be equally effective at reducing craving but more effective than 
suppression (Beadman et al., 2015).  
The SRC task suggests that the Defusion group displayed some 
motivational bias towards smoking stimuli compared to the Alternative 
Imagery group, although this was only seen in “first” responses and not in 
response times.  Mogg and colleagues (2003) argue that stimuli evaluated as 
positive should be linked to a faster approach responses.  This suggests that 
there was a difference in how smoking stimuli were evaluated between 
groups, with the Defusion group evaluating them more positively or as more 
appetitive.  A possible explanation could be the higher levels of craving in this 
group, however there were no correlations between craving and response 
times which does not support this explanation.  Thus it is unclear why this 
difference occurred.  A tentative explanation could be that this behaviour 
could represent an extinction burst, in which there is an increase in a 
behaviour following a reduction of typical reinforcement (Cooper, Heron, & 
Heward, 2007).  It may have been that attempting to get distance from 
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smoking images provoked a type of extinction burst in which once smoking 
stimuli were explicitly presented, there was an increase in approach behaviour.  
Unexpectedly, the Alternative Imagery group were slower to respond to 
neutral stimuli compared to the Defusion group.  It is also unclear why this 
occurred. 
Neither strategy had an impact on positive emotion; negative emotion, 
however, increased during the imagery cue-induction and decreased following 
strategy use for both groups.  Negative affect has been shown to have a causal 
link with desire to smoke (Heckman et al., 2013; Schlauch et al., 2013).  
Strategies, such as those in these study, which promote the reduction of 
negative affect may thus be a beneficial part of effective smoking cessation 
programs (Heckman et al., 2013).  This result is in contrast to work by Szasz 
et al (2012) who found an increase in negative affect over time when an 
acceptance strategy was used.  The results from the current study may reflect 
the relatively greater time participants spent performing the strategy, as well 
as provision of a more detailed rationale for the strategy. Alternatively the 
difference in findings may reflect a greater impact of imagery on affect than 
verbal strategies (Mathews et al., 2013).   
Contrary to the exploratory hypotheses, the Defusion strategy was no 
more effective than the Alternative Imagery strategy at reducing affect, or at 
reducing craving or changing smoking behaviour at follow-up.  There may be 
a number of possible explanations for the lack of difference between the two.  
The Defusion group reported experiencing higher levels of craving at all time-
points.  Although both groups showed similar and significant reductions over 
time, it may be that the overall higher levels of craving in the Defusion group 
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affected their ability to concentrate on the task.  Nicotine appears to confer 
cognitive benefits in terms of concentration (Heishman, Kleykamp, & 
Singleton, 2010) and nicotine deprivation has been linked to self-reported 
levels of low concentration (Giannakoulas, Katramados, Melas, 
Diamantopoulos, & Chimonas, 2003; McEwen, Hajek, McRobbie, & West, 
2006).   
It is also possible that the Alternative Imagery condition may have 
represented a more simple and familiar strategy.  Indeed, those in the 
Alternative Imagery condition were more likely to have reported using the 
strategy before the experiment.  In addition, the Alternative Imagery group 
reporting finding it a significantly more helpful strategy. The Defusion 
condition may have required participants to undergo a paradigmatic shift in 
understanding thinking processes which may have been harder to adhere to 
and less motivating.  This may be reflected in the lower rates of 7 day follow-
up data in the Defusion group.  This has been a weakness in other studies 
investigating ACT related processes, such as acceptance techniques, in which 
acceptance appears to have been harder to understand than other conditions 
(Litvin, Kovacs, Hayes, & Brandon, 2012). 
The Defusion strategy may only have been effective because, as the 
Alternative Imagery strategy is hypothesised to, it was taking up visuospatial 
resources within working memory.  However, the suggestive effects of 
Defusion on pleasantness and compellingness of the visual imagery may 
indicate that these reflect a different mechanism of action on smoking-related 
imagery relative to image replacement.  Although these results must be 
interpreted with caution, it would appear that reductions in how compelling 
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and pleasant smoking images were experienced in those in the Defusion may 
reflect a process of relating differently to their mental imagery.   Recent work 
by Beadman and colleagues (Beadman et al., 2015) showed a reduction in 
experiential avoidance relating to pre-and post-verbal defusion strategy.  
Although there was no difference between groups in this study, this was only 
measured post-strategy use.  Measuring this at baseline and at follow-up 
would allow a greater understanding of any process change within the 
Defusion group. 
The design of the Defusion strategy may have also limited its 
effectiveness.  This is the first experimental study that the author is aware of 
that uses a defusion from imagery technique.  Most research in this area has 
focused on verbal thoughts using a verbal technique, the “milk, milk, milk” 
exercise, in which words are repeated to draw attention to their non-symbolic 
properties and thus gain distance from them (e.g. De Young, Lavender, 
Washington, Looby, & Anderson, 2010; Masuda, Hayes, Sackett, & Twohig, 
2004; Watson, Burley, & Purdon, 2010).  The defusion technique used in this 
study was designed to have minimal visual properties, but it may need to be 
further refined to be effective.   
This design is closest to the “Leaves on the Stream” technique (Hayes 
et al., 2011).  Hayes and colleagues argue that metaphors can draw attention to 
functions not present in the current behavioural functional repertoire, and help 
transfer these functions.  Leaves on the stream includes two metaphorical 
elements; the water moving, and leaves moving on the water.   The defusion 
technique used here only contains one function (i.e. that water moves).  It may 
be that having both elements in the strategy would better support people’s 
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ability to experience their thoughts differently, e.g. “my smoking images can 
move on the water as leaves move, coming and going at their own pace.”  
Further, it may have been more effective to ask participants to do something 
differently to their imagery before placing it on the water, for example, 
imagining putting a frame around it.  This would have further drawn attention 
to the intrinsic properties of the mental imagery experience, thus supporting 
defusion, compared to a fusion with the symbolic properties, i.e. imagery-as-
real. 
 
Limitations 
The study had some limitations that should be considered when 
interpreting the results.  As noted above, the lack of a control condition is a 
key limitation. Suppression has been used as a comparison craving regulation 
condition in a number of studies relating to cigarette craving (Beadman et al., 
2015; Litvin et al., 2012; Rogojanski, Vettese, & Antony, 2011).  If 
recruitment to this condition had been possible, it would have allowed more 
robust conclusions to be drawn regarding the relative effectiveness of the two 
strategies investigated in this study.  Further, the rationales for all three 
strategies presented an explanation of the link between mental imagery and 
behaviour; in order to increase adherence and credibility, this was presented as 
factual.  The study may have benefitted from a more in-depth exploration of 
how participants experience responding to their mental imagery.  
This study focused exclusively on visual mental imagery, but this may 
have limited the effectiveness of the intervention.  Some participants 
spontaneously mentioned olfactory and gustatory imagery, and including these 
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within the strategy may have reflected more fully the experience of craving.  
Both groups indicated an increase in mind-wandering over time and thus 
results may have been affected by reduced concentration.  Strategies to 
maintain concentration may been useful to include. 
Further, the power to detect an effect at follow-up will have been 
limited by the reduced sample size, particularly in the Defusion group.  
Compliance with the follow-up and strategy use could have been increased 
with reminders during the week, for example.  In addition, selecting a sample 
which intended to quit smoking imminently may have increased adherence.  
The Timeline Follow-back instrument may also not be the most accurate 
measurement of number of cigarettes compared to e.g. ecological momentary 
assessment (EMA; Shiffman, 2009).  Although beyond the scope of this study, 
EMA may have provided more accurate data and in addition served as an 
implicit reminder to use the strategy, thereby potentially increasing 
compliance. 
 
Future research 
This study would have benefited from a control condition, in order to 
understand better to what extent the craving regulation strategies were 
effective and to what extent study attendance influenced the outcome.  More 
work is needed to refine defusion from imagery techniques in experimental 
settings. As discussed above, a refinement of or alternative defusion from 
imagery technique may have been more comprehensible, e.g. imagining the 
smoking image projected against a wall, or on a television screen.  Given the 
potential limitations of presenting defusion in this short experimental context, 
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future research may benefit from a more extensive explanation of the context 
and rationale for defusion.   
 
Clinical implications  
The present study suggests that mental imagery is an important part of 
the craving experience for cigarettes, and indicates that cognitive strategies 
which address the impact of this imagery may form a key part of smoking 
cessation attempts.  The two strategies investigated here, Defusion and 
Alternative Imagery, were both effective at reducing cravings and number of 
cigarettes smoked at follow-up, despite this being a short experimental 
intervention.  Although research is limited, mental imagery has also been 
shown to play a role in other substance misuse disorders (e.g. Bradley & 
Moorey, 1988), and thus the craving regulation strategies developed here may 
have clinical utility in wider contexts. 
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This critical appraisal will focus on three main areas of reflection on the 
Empirical paper; designing the novel intervention, the limitations of the study 
design, and the recruitment difficulties and the subsequent impact on the study. 
 
1. Designing a novel intervention 
The imagery craving regulation task developed for this study was a novel 
experimental approach.  The principles (and practicalities) of the design were 
based on those developed in a previous related project (Beadman et al., 2015) 
and this made the design considerably easier.  In Beadman et al’s study, three 
craving regulation conditions were designed; a suppression condition, a 
reappraisal condition and a verbal defusion condition.  However, my study 
differed in a key domain; the use of mental imagery.   This reflected my research 
experience prior to being accepted onto the course (Holmes et al., 2011; Pearson, 
Deeprose, Wallace-Hadrill, Burnett Heyes, & Holmes, 2013).  Addressing 
mental imagery rather than verbal thoughts had a number of consequences for 
how the conditions were designed.  The study was designed in close consultation 
with my supervisor, and in addition, experts in the fields of mental imagery and 
smoking were consulted regarding the instructions. 
 
1.1. Consulting with experts 
Expert reviewers made a number of extremely helpful points that were 
incorporated into the instructions where appropriate.  However, as noted and 
discussed below, some of the comments were not included.  For example, one 
reviewer argued that calling the conditions “cognitive” distancing/ 
distraction/elimination was too jargonistic.  This was retained, however the 
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choice of this terminology was deliberate and was designed in order to increase 
the credibility of the description.   A question was also raised as to whether 
asking participants about the perspective of their image was a form of distancing 
in itself.  While this is an interesting theoretical point, we retained this, as this 
was both an exploratory measure of interest, and as all participants receive this 
instruction, it would be consistent across conditions. 
 
1.2. Selection of the type of smoking mental imagery to address 
Mental imagery can be experienced in any of the five senses (Kosslyn, 
Ganis, & Thompson, 2001).    Several of the expert reviewers of the task 
instructions noted that craving would be involved with multisensory imagery, 
e.g. taste and sound. The decision taken to concentrate on the visual imagery 
aspects for experimental simplicity, and because asking participants to use a 
novel technique to “defuse” from olfactory imagery for example, may simply be 
too complex a procedure for such a short experimental time setting. However, 
the instructions were amended in the introduction to reference the fact that while 
imagery can be in all five senses, this study would concentrate on visual imagery. 
Nonetheless, this may have limited the effectiveness of the strategies, as it did 
not address key aspects of participants’ experience.  
 
1.3. Designing the three conditions 
1.3.1. Designing the Defusion condition 
To my knowledge, no previous studies have investigated in an 
experimental setting either using an imagery technique for defusion, or any 
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technique to defuse from imagery (Levin, Hildebrandt, Lillis, & Hayes, 2012).  
As a result, the design of this technique necessitated careful consideration.    
There were at least two possible ways for it to be designed.  The 
intervention could be a “defusion using an imagery technique”, i.e. using an 
imagery technique to defuse from any arising smoking-related thoughts, images, 
feelings etc.  Alternatively, and this was the design chosen for the study, the 
intervention could be a “defusion from imagery” condition, i.e. using a defusion 
technique to defuse from images that arise.  Thus, the intervention is designed to 
help participants defuse from their imagery of craving, not to use imagery to 
defuse from verbal thoughts.   
However, just as verbal defusion techniques are often used to defuse from 
verbal thoughts (e.g. “I notice I am having the thought that…” or repeating a 
word so that attention is drawn to its intrinsic functions, e.g. sound, rather than 
its symbolic functions of the words, e.g. the link between a word and what it 
describes), so images that arise can be addressed using imagery defusion 
techniques.  This is a clinical technique described by Russ Harris (Harris, 2008, 
2009).  One imagery defusion technique commonly used is that of “Leaves on a 
Stream” (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 2011) or an alternative suggested by Harris 
is a “moving blackness” (Harris, 2009, p.114).  However, this imagery technique 
can be used to defuse from any internal experiences, i.e. verbal-thoughts, images, 
feelings etc so is not exclusively a technique for imagery.   
This lead to a question over which type of defusion intervention would be 
most effective, i.e. whether we should select a verbal or imagery technique to 
defuse from images.   Potential verbal techniques could have been asking 
participants to say  “I notice my mind is showing me a picture of…”, or asking 
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them to name the ‘television station’ these images are associated with, i.e. the 
“name the story” technique (Harris, 2009).  However, although there was no 
specific evidence that I was able to identify of the importance of matching 
modality (i.e. verbal techniques for verbal thoughts, imagery techniques for 
images), it seemed reasonable to argue that for the purposes of this study, it may 
be clearer and more comprehensible for participants to link their images to an 
imagery technique.  
The pilot study design asked participants to imagine a "moving 
blackness."  The technique of imagining placing an image on a moving blackness 
was piloted with several different people from a range of professions (i.e. not 
simply psychology students/professionals) to verify whether this was something 
that could be achieved. All eight professionals (ranging from telecoms engineers 
to a garage mechanic) were asked if they were able to imagine a moving 
blackness; all were able to, with descriptions varying from a black moving cloud 
to an oil slick. They were then asked to imagine their own front door, and when 
they indicated they had this image in mind, they were asked to place this image 
onto the moving blackness and let it float away. All reported being able to do 
this, and described for example, seeing it "bobbing away." 
 However, in the instruction review stage, it was felt that a moving 
blackness may cue participants into a negative frame of mind, and hence the 
instructions were changed to a “moving liquid” to be more affectively neutral.  In 
addition, the order of imagining the image and the moving substance was 
changed, in order to closer match the other instructions' wording. Thus 
participants were asked to imagine "placing their smoking image onto a moving 
liquid" rather than imagining the moving liquid first and then imagining placing 
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their image on it. This is arguably an extremely minor difference, but it may be 
that it conflated two instructions in an unhelpful way; participants are both being 
asked to imagine a new and previously unmentioned type of image, and to do 
something unusual, i.e. place an image on an image. 
 
1.3.2. Designing the Alternative Imagery condition 
A review of the literature indicated that a number of studies investigating 
craving regulation used visual cues as a prompt to imagine the appearance of, for 
example, a rainbow or hot air balloon (e.g. Harvey, Kemps, & Tiggemann, 
2005).  Other studies included guided visual imagery scripts (e.g. Versland & 
Rosenberg, 2007).  As the conditions needed to be carefully matched, it was 
decided to specify the imagery (i.e. a river-side scene), but allow participants to 
create further detail in their imagination. 
Commentary from the expert reviewers suggested that participants may 
not find the defusion instructions as compelling, due to the alternative imagery 
condition being more pleasant and detailed.  However, we continued to keep the 
alternative imagery more visually detailed than the defusion condition.  This 
meant the defusion condition was visually ‘under powered;’ if a difference 
between these two conditions had been found, this would have added further 
support for this difference not being due to visuo-spatial details only.   
 
1.3.3. Designing the Suppression condition 
In Beadman el al’s (2015) study, suppression was rated as significantly 
less credible than the other two conditions.  Attention was therefore paid to the 
language used in this condition.  For example, the decision was taken to replace 
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the word “suppression” with the word “elimination.”  This was intended to 
increase credibility.  Nonetheless, the suppression instructions remained to some 
degree circular, i.e. control your thoughts by controlling them.  As this condition 
was not used in the final study (see below for further discussion), it was not 
possible to know whether this strategy would have been rated as equally credible. 
This condition was also a verbal condition, i.e. there were no instructions to use 
imagery.  This was chosen because if participants were asked to suppress their 
imagery using an imagery technique, it would cease to be a control for the other 
two strategies, and represent another type of imagery strategy. 
One expert reviewer suggested adding instructions to 'please try to push 
away the cigarette image but do not try to bring to mind something else' to avoid 
overlap with the alternative imagery condition.  This is a valid point and may 
have reduced potential confounding factors.  However, following discussion with 
my supervisor, it was decided that this could also represent a confounding factor, 
i.e. introducing the idea that bringing to mind something else was possible.  It 
was also thought that this could be too demanding for participants. 
 
1.3.4. Matching the three conditions 
The task instructions were designed so that all three matched as closely as 
possible on as many parameters as possible, to control for confounding 
variables.  For example, the three sets of instructions matched on word count, 
number of times the word smoking or other related words were used, and grade 
level and readability as measured by Fleisch-Kincaid scores.   See Appendices 8 
-13 for full instructions. The instructions were also matched as closely as 
possible word for word. The result of this was three almost identical sets of 
  
 145 
instructions with the exception of key words and phrases pertaining to each 
condition. Thus, the rationale for each condition was in as many ways as possible 
identical. The aim of this was in part to control for possible experimenter bias but 
also to ensure that no one condition was more persuasive and credible than the 
others.  The two conditions reported in the study were perceived by participants 
to be equally credible. 
The process of matching these instructions was a particular challenge, to 
ensure that the rationales and task instructions still reflected the individual 
strategies as stand-alone tasks. In particular, the wording for the suppression 
condition limited what it was possible to say in the other two strategies, and at 
times this was frustrating.   However, other studies investigating craving 
regulation strategies report only limited rationales and instructions; this study 
was able to more fully describe rationales and provide experiential elements as 
recommended by Levin and colleagues (Levin et al., 2012) 
I was also mindful of my strong clinical interest in Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (Hayes et al., 2011).  This guided the study design 
throughout.  However, I was also aware that, despite best intentions, this might 
induce experimenter bias.  The careful matching of the instructions was in part 
designed to counteract this possible effect.   As far as was possible, I was blind to 
condition, i.e. when administering the baseline questionnaires.  However, after 
this point I was not blind to condition as I had to select the correct strategy 
instructions, and this could theoretically have influenced my administration of 
questionnaires for example.  This is a limitation of the design of this study as it 
introduces further possibility for experimenter bias.  Ideally, at the least, follow-
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up calls should have been completed by someone blind to condition, but given 
the parameters of this research, this was not possible. 
 
2. Limitations of the study design 
As discussed above, the instructions for all three conditions were as 
closely matched as possible.  However, it is possible that designing the 
instructions in this way may have compromised the effectiveness of the 
interventions, in particular, the Defusion condition.  This represents a very 
different approach to thinking about how to experience and manage thoughts, 
compared to what participants are likely to have encountered before.  This is 
likely to have been the first time that participants have been introduced to ideas 
of defusion, and thus perhaps the design of the experiment may have benefitted 
from explanations tailored to the condition, rather than concentrating on 
matching them so closely. 
As part of the compliance check for both conditions, participants were 
asked to describe whether they had been able to use the strategy and what they 
did during the practice. This allowed for the experimenter to establish whether 
instructions had been followed and provide clarification where necessary.  The 
majority of participants indicated that they had been able to follow the task 
instructions.  However, 25% of the defusion group did not follow the instructions 
exactly and appeared to struggle to take a non-literal understanding of these 
instructions.  For example, one participant reported that he had been unable to 
imagine placing the image of himself buying cigarettes at his local supermarket 
on a river as there was no actual river by this supermarket geographically.  
Another said, on clarification that the smoking image should be placed on the 
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moving liquid, “that would be hard because what if that were the last cigarette 
available to me?  I’d have to get it out,” indicating a potential conflation between 
a mental image of a cigarette and the cigarette itself. 
 It was difficult for me not to provide detailed feedback on how to follow 
the task exactly, using examples from my clinical experience.  I was aware of 
this as a temptation, and attempted to remain as neutral a researcher as possible 
in both conditions to avoid experimenter bias.   
By contrast, the Alternative Imagery condition may well reflect a more 
commonly used strategy and is more intuitive.  This strategy, as one participant 
suggested, can easily be summarised in one sentence, e.g. "imagine something 
else", whereas conceptually defusion requires much more explanation.  Although 
25% of the Alternative Imagery group also required clarification at the 
compliance check, this tended to be because they had spontaneously imagined 
another scene (e.g. playing cricket). 
The compliance check was followed by a post-task manipulation check, 
using three Likert scales to rate the extent to which participants had used three 
strategies, defusion, image replacement and suppression.  The manipulation 
check wording was designed by myself and my supervisor, and was intended to 
differentially describe each of the three strategies.  The wording was tailored for 
each strategy: “How much did you try to replace your smoking image with a 
different image?” (Alternative Imagery), “How much did you try to get distance 
from your smoking image by letting it come and go freely?” (Defusion) and 
“How much did try to you erase your smoking image?” (Suppression).  These 
descriptions were designed to closely align with the directions participants would 
have received in the experimental booklets.  The expectation was that 
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participants would score highly in their particular condition and much lower in 
the other two conditions, as these represented instructions they had not received. 
The manipulation checks for the two strategies of interest, Defusion and 
Alternative Imagery, did show ratings in the expected direction.  However, 
qualitative information from the rating of these items suggests that participants 
did not necessarily understood the statements to reflect very different strategies.  
Some participants scored highly on all three measures, including the Suppression 
item, despite having received no instructions to erase the image.  Participants 
appeared to interpret these statements in idiosyncratic ways.  For example, 
participants in the Defusion condition endorsed the higher end of the “replacing” 
Likert scale; on questioning, this was for example because they were “trying to 
think of something happy” or they had imagined doing something other than 
smoking in their image, neither of which matched my expectations for how 
people would interpret this question.  Similarly, participants in the Alternative 
Imagery condition endorsed the higher end of the “getting distance” Likert scale, 
because they explained their mind had wandered, they had pushed their image 
away or they had tried to focus on the river, none of which related to my 
understanding of defusion. This was obtained as ad hoc feedback, but the study 
may have benefitted from a more detailed qualitative question about what 
participants did during the task. 
 The difference between my expectations and participant responses may 
be in part potentially due to my giving insufficient context for these items.  For 
example, if participants had been told that there are several different strategies 
which can be used, of which these are three representative strategies, it is likely 
that they would have identified their own strategy more readily, reducing the 
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potential overlap due to misunderstanding of the statements.  It is also possible 
that the statements themselves could have been worded in more clearly.  
 However, it may also reflect the extent to which participants employ 
multiple approaches to managing their imagery, particularly when it is unwanted. 
The relatively high scores on the suppression item may indicate that this is a 
natural strategy used by people to manage their craving imagery.  
 
3. Recruitment process 
Recruitment is a crucial part of experimental research but is also 
anecdotally an area of particular difficulty. My experience of recruitment for this 
study was no different. The original recruitment plan had been to advertise the 
study across a range of platforms, the most important of which was a university-
wide email.   In previous years, this email had successfully attracted up to 40% 
of eligible study participants.  However, at the beginning of my recruitment 
process, it was unexpectedly announced that after years of this email being 
available to researchers within the university, it had been discontinued. Despite 
attempts at negotiation with the university, this decision remained in place.  
Therefore a major source of recruitment was unavailable.   
 
3.1. Recruitment strategies 
Thus, the process of recruitment was a particularly difficult experience 
for me.  I tried a number of different strategies to recruit participants, including 
the university’s participant pool, handing out leaflets to people who were 
smoking, putting up posters, joining London-based online social media groups to 
post to their pages and asking friends and family to forward my study details.  
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These strategies yielded very few participants.   The most successful recruitment 
strategy was to recruit in another city, Cambridge, where my parents are based, 
and where I had access to a room in which I could complete testing.  Seventeen 
of the study’s participants came from Cambridge; without this, the study would 
have been underpowered. 
Most of my participants were recruited from online advertising sites such 
as Gumtree. This reaches a broad section of the population but my experience 
was that they were also variably motivated to attend their study appointments 
(despite confirmation and reminders). Of the 67 eligible participants identified, 
14 did not arrive for their appointments or respond to an offer to rearrange; 12 of 
these were from Gumtree. 
In addition, the study retained its relatively stringent exclusion criteria.  
This focused on participants having a particular level of motivation to quit 
smoking as measured by the Motivation to Stop Smoking Scale (Kotz, Brown, & 
West, 2013) and a certain level of nicotine dependence as measured by the 
Fagerstrom test for nicotine dependence (Heatherton, Kozlowski, Frecker, & 
Fagerstrom, 1991).  42 people were not eligible based on their smoking-cessation 
motivation score and 89 on their nicotine dependence score.  If these criteria had 
been moved, it may have been possible to recruit more people; however, 
retaining these ensured that the study was as clinically relevant as possible.  
Indeed, if the participants had had higher levels of motivation to quit smoking, 
adherence to strategy use at follow-up may have been greater. 
 
3.2. Suspension of recruitment to the suppression condition 
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Unfortunately, due to the cancellation of the university-wide email, and 
despite using the same alternative recruitment strategies used by other 
researchers in the department, my recruitment was extremely slow in the first 
couple of months. As a result of this, a pragmatic decision was taken not to 
recruit further to the suppression condition. The two participants who had 
completed this condition were excluded from the analyses.   
As a result, I was unable to compare the two imagery conditions to another 
"control" condition.  This has severely limited the conclusions that can be drawn 
from the study.  The defusion and alternative imagery strategies were as effective 
as each other at reducing craving, number of cigarettes smoked and negative 
affect.  Data from the suppression condition would have allowed further 
conclusions to be drawn, e.g. whether these two conditions were more effective 
than a control.  Without this, it is possible that the explanation for the reduction 
in craving etc is due to having participated in the experiment (i.e. discussing 
smoking, learning a strategy to manage cravings and receiving a follow-up 
telephone call). 
The suppression condition also, as noted above, represented a verbal 
condition.  This would have provided a contrast to the imagery-strategies used, 
which has been shown to be of interest in other empirical studies (Nelis, 
Vanbrabant, Holmes, & Raes, 2012). 
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Web of Science search terms: 
 
“Vantage Perspective” OR  “Vantage point” OR  “Field perspective” OR  
“Observer perspective” OR  “Observer’s perspective” OR “Field-observer 
perspective” OR  “Observer perspective-taking” OR   “First person perspective” 
OR  “1st person  perspective” OR   “Third person perspective” OR “3rd person 
perspective” OR  “Perspective taking” OR  “Psychological distanc*” OR  
“Visual perspective” OR   “Self distanc*” OR  “Self immer*” 
 
AND 
 
Emotion* OR “psychological well-being” OR “psychological wellbeing” OR 
Stress* OR Trauma* OR Anxiety OR anxious OR Depress* OR Dysphori* OR 
Anger OR angry OR  phobi* OR fear OR disgust OR worry 
 
AND 
 
“Self-imag*” OR “Mental Image*” OR Image* OR Imagin* OR Memor* OR 
“Verbal process*” OR  “Self-talk*” OR  “Self-evaluat*” OR  Analy$* OR 
Ruminat* OR avoid* OR  evaluat* OR repetitive OR intru* OR future OR 
prospect* 
 
PsychInfo search terms: 
 
1. (Vantage adj Perspective) 
2. (Vantage adj point) 
3. (Field adj perspective) 
4. (Observer adj perspective) 
5. ("Observer’s" adj perspective) 
6. (Field-observer adj perspective) 
7. (Observer adj perspective-taking) 
8. (First adj (person adj perspective)) 
9. (1st adj (person adj perspective)) 
10. (Third adj (person adj perspective)) 
11. (3rd adj (person adj perspective)) 
12. (Perspective adj taking) 
13. (Psychological adj distanc*) 
14. (Visual adj perspective) 
15. Self-distanc* 
16. Self-immer* 
17. 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or 9 or 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 or 14 or 15 or 16 
18. emotion* 
19. ((Psychological adj well-being) or (Psychological adj wellbeing)) 
20. Stress* 
21. Trauma* 
22. (Anxiety or anxious) 
23. Depress* 
24. Dysphori* 
25. (Anger or angry) 
26. Fear 
27. Phobi* 
28. Disgust* 
29. Worry 
30. exp Emotional Regulation/ 
31. exp Emotions/ 
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32. exp Emotional Disturbances/ 
33. exp mental disorders/ 
34. 18 or 19 or 20 or 21 or 22 or 23 or 24 or 25 or 26 or 27 or 28 or 29 or 30 or 31 or 32 or 33 
35. (self adj image*) 
36. (mental adj image*) 
37. image* 
38. imagin* 
39. memor* 
40. exp Memory/ 
41. exp Imagination/ 
42. exp Self Concept/ 
43. (verbal adj process*) 
44. self-talk* 
45. self-evaluat* 
46. Analy$* 
47. ruminat* 
48. avoid* 
49. evaluat* 
50. evaluat* 
51. repetitive 
52. intrus* 
53. future 
54. prospect* 
55. exp Cognitive Processes/ 
56. exp Self Talk/ 
57. exp Self Evaluation/ 
58. 35 or 36 or 37 or 38 or 39 or 40 or 41 or 42 or 43 or 44 or 45 or 46 or 47 or 48 or 49 or 50 or 
51 or 52 or 53 or 54 or 55 or 56 or 57 
59. 17 and 34 and 58 
60. limit 59 to (human and english language and journal article and yr="1980 -Current") 
 
 
Medline search terms: 
 
1. (Vantage adj Perspective) 
2. (Vantage adj point) 
3. (Field adj perspective) 
4. (Observer adj perspective) 
5. ("Observer’s" adj perspective) 
6. (Field-observer adj perspective) 
7. (Observer adj perspective-taking) 
8. (First adj (person adj perspective)) 
9. (1st adj (person adj perspective)) 
10. (Third adj (person adj perspective)) 
11. (3rd adj (person adj perspective)) 
12. (Perspective adj taking) 
13. (psychological adj distance) 
14. (Visual adj perspective) 
15. "Self-distanc$" 
16. (Self adj immer$) 
17. 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or 9 or 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 or 14 or 15 or 16 
18. Emotion$ 
19. psychological well-being 
20. psychological wellbeing 
21. stress$ 
22. Trauma$ 
23. (anxiety or anxious) 
24. Depress$ 
25. Dysphori$ 
26. (Anger or angry) 
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27. phobi$ 
28. fear 
29. disgust$ 
30. worry 
31. exp Emotions/ 
32. exp Mental Disorders/ 
33. exp Depression/ 
34. exp Stress, Psychological/ 
35. exp affective symptoms/ or exp aggression/ 
36. exp Mental Health/ 
37. 18 or 19 or 20 or 21 or 22 or 23 or 24 or 25 or 26 or 27 or 28 or 29 or 30 or 31 or 32 or 33 or 
34 or 35 or 36 
38. Self-imag$ 
39. (Mental adj Image$) 
40. Image$ 
41. Imagin$ 
42. memor$ 
43. exp Memory/ 
44. exp Imagination/ 
45. exp "Imagery (Psychotherapy)"/ 
46. (Verbal adj process$) 
47. Self-talk$ 
48. Self-evaluat$ 
49. Analy#$ 
50. Ruminat$ 
51. avoid$ 
52. evaluat$ 
53. repetitive 
54. intru$ 
55. future 
56. prospect$ 
57. exp Self Concept/ 
58. exp Cognition/ 
59. exp Communication/ 
60. 38 or 39 or 40 or 41 or 42 or 43 or 44 or 45 or 46 or 47 or 48 or 49 or 50 or 51 or 52 or 53 or 
54 or 55 or 56 or 57 or 58 or 59 
61. 17 and 37 and 60 
62. limit 61 to (english language and humans and yr="1980 -Current" and journal article) 
63. (psychological adj distanc$) 
64. 17 or 63 
65. 37 and 60 and 64 
66. limit 65 to (english language and humans and yr="1980 -Current" and journal article) 
 
EMBASE search terms 
 
1. (Vantage adj Perspective) 
2. (Vantage adj point) 
3. (Field adj perspective) 
4. (Observer adj perspective) 
5. (Field-observer adj perspective) 
6. (Observer adj perspective-taking) 
7. (First adj (person adj perspective)) 
8. (1st adj (person adj perspective)) 
9. (Third adj (person adj perspective)) 
10. (3rd adj (person adj perspective)) 
11. (perspective adj taking) 
12. (Psychological adj distance) 
13. (visual adj perspective) 
14. Self-distanc$ 
15. (Self adj immer$) 
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16. 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or 9 or 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 or 14 or 15 
17. Emotion$ 
18. ((Psychological adj well-being) or (Psychological adj wellbeing)) 
19. stress$ 
20. Trauma$ 
21. (anxiety or anxious) 
22. Depress$ 
23. Dysphori$ 
24. (Anger or angry) 
25. phobi$ 
26. fear 
27. disgust$ 
28. worry 
29. exp emotion/ 
30. exp mental disease/ 
31. exp emotionality/ 
32. exp mental health/ 
33. exp stress/ 
34. exp social stress/ 
35. (Psychological adj distanc$) 
36. 16 or 35 
37. 17 or 18 or 19 or 20 or 21 or 22 or 23 or 24 or 25 or 26 or 27 or 28 or 29 or 30 or 31 or 32 or 
33 or 34 
38. Self-imag$ 
39. (Mental adj Image$) 
40. Image$ 
41. Imagin$ 
42. memor$ 
43. exp thinking/ 
44. exp cognition/ 
45. (Verbal adj process$) 
46. Self-talk$ 
47. self-evaluat$ 
48. Analy#$ 
49. Ruminat$ 
50. avoid$ 
51. evaluat$ 
52. repetitive 
53. intrus$ 
54. future 
55. prospect$ 
56. exp verbal behavior/ 
57. exp self concept/ 
58. 38 or 39 or 40 or 41 or 42 or 43 or 44 or 45 or 46 or 47 or 48 or 49 or 50 or 51 or 52 or 53 or 
54 or 55 or 56 or 57 
59. 36 and 37 and 58 
60. limit 59 to (human and english language and yr="1980 -Current" and journal) 
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Information Sheet for Smokers Involved in Verbal and Visuospatial Stimulus-
Processing Research Studies                                                   
You will be given a copy of this information sheet. 
Title of Project: Craving changes. How do verbal and visuospatial strategies modify 
craving experiences in heavy smokers and drinkers? 
This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee (Project ID 
Number): 0760/002 
Name Sophie Wallace-Hadrill 
Work address Research Department of Clinical, Educational and Health Psychology 
University College London, Gower Street, London. WC1E 6BT 
Contact details  Email: sophie.wallace-hadrill.12@ucl.ac.uk Telephone: [XXXXX] 
Details of Study: This study examines the effects of psychological task performance on 
craving experiences in smokers. We are interested in whether experiences of craving 
change when people engage in either visuospatial tasks (those involving images, shapes and 
object locations) or verbal tasks (those involving memory or instructions to use attention in 
a particular way). It is not currently known if performing these psychological tasks 
increases or decreases craving; whether they simply act as a distraction or can have a 
genuine and direct effect on craving itself. By learning more about the mental activities that 
increase or decrease craving we may be able to develop strategies for managing craving or 
identify activities that people should avoid to prevent cravings from increasing, especially if 
they are trying to avoid smoking. More generally, these experiments will help us discover 
more about the psychological processes that underpin the experience of craving, which in 
the long-term, may help in the development of psychological treatments for addictions.  
Who can take part? If you are generally healthy and smoke eight or more cigarettes per 
day and are between 18-60 years old, fluent in English, have normal or corrected to normal 
vision, have no current serious psychological illness, no current alcohol or drug dependence 
(apart from tobacco-related products) and have not taken part in a similar study, you may be 
eligible to take part. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
We will arrange for you to attend an appointment at UCL at a time convenient for you. You 
will need to refrain from smoking for at least 2 hours prior to this appointment. Your 
researcher will give you more specific instructions. You should not eat or drink any 
caffeinated drinks for three hours and any alcohol in the 12 hours prior to the appointment. 
Also you should not have used any recreational drugs in the last 24 hours. When you arrive 
we will take a measurement of the carbon monoxide in your breath.  
 
You will then be given some questionnaires to measure your cravings, mood, attitudes 
about smoking, smoking history and use of other drugs. Next you will take part in 
computerized and pen and paper tasks before filling out the questionnaire measuring levels 
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of craving again. The tasks will involve asking you to look at videos related to smoking. 
While you do this, we will measure your reaction times. We may also measure your bodily 
reactions, such as heart rate, blood pressure and skin conductance. Depending on the task 
you are randomly assigned to, you will also receive instructions to think about your mental 
and physical experiences in a different way, to think about future consequences to your 
health if you continue to smoke, or to perform a memory task. All of this will take up to one 
and a half hours. After this you will be paid for your time. We will ask you to email/text us 
to let us know how much time passed before you smoked your next cigarette. We would 
also like to contact you again: once after 24 hours, and again a week later to ask you some 
very brief (up to 5 minutes) additional questions about your experience since the 
appointment. During this time, you may also be asked to give us another measurement of 
your breath carbon monoxide. You may contact the researcher at any time after the study if 
you experience any difficulties. 
 
Are there any risks in taking part? 
There are no known risks in completing the questionnaires or tasks but looking at videos 
related to smoking and thinking about negative consequences of smoking can be 
temporarily mildly distressing. The request that you do not smoke for at least 2 hours prior 
to the session may mean that you experience some stress or agitation but this will be short-
lived.  
 
Are there any benefits to taking part? 
You will not benefit directly from taking part in this research but your participation will 
help us gain a better understanding of the experience of craving which may lead to better 
strategies for managing these challenging experiences. In addition, some of the tasks 
involved in the experiment can be interesting and enjoyable.  
 
Please discuss the information above with others if you wish or ask us if there is anything 
that is not clear or if you would like more information.  
 
It is up to you to decide whether to take part or not; choosing not to take part will not 
disadvantage you in any way. If you do decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at 
any time and without giving a reason.   
 
All data will be collected and stored in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
All information which is collected about you during the course of the research will be kept 
strictly confidential and will be securely stored electronically, using a numbered code so 
that you cannot be identified. Only researchers directly involved in the study will have 
access to the data. All data will be stored in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
The data will be used only for informing the research question in this study and the results 
of the research will be disseminated in peer-reviewed scientific journals, but you will in no 
way be identifiable from such publications. 
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Informed Consent Form for Smokers Involved in Verbal and Visuospatial 
Stimulus-Processing Research Studies 
 
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and/or listened to an 
explanation about the research.  
Title of Project: Craving changes? How do verbal and visuospatial strategies modify 
craving experiences in heavy smokers and drinkers 
This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee (Project ID Number): 
0760/002 
Thank you for your interest in taking part in this research. Before you agree to take part, the 
person organising the research must explain the project to you. 
If you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or explanation already given to 
you, please ask the researcher before you to decide whether to join in.  You will be given a 
copy of this Consent Form to keep and refer to at any time.  
Participant’s Statement  
 
I       
 have read the notes written above and the Information Sheet, and understand what the 
study involves 
 understand that if I decide at any time that I no longer wish to take part in this project, I 
can notify the researchers involved and withdraw immediately.  
 consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research 
study. 
 understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in 
accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998. 
 agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction 
and I agree to take part in this study.  
Signed:         Date:       
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Sona email to be sent following screening: 
 
Dear Xxx, 
 
Thank you very much for expressing interest in participating in our research 
project entitled ‘Craving changes; how do verbal and visuospatial strategies 
modify craving experiences in heavy smokers and drinkers?’ I am emailing to 
confirm that your appointment is (date, time, location).  
 
Just to remind you, a condition of participation is that you will need to abstain 
from smoking for at least eight hours prior to the appointment. This will be 
assessed through administration of a Carbon Monoxide measurement. 
 
Participation will take approximately one hour and you will be paid £10. If you 
consent to be called on two occasions during the following week for two brief 
phone calls you will receive an extra £2.50. Each telephone call will take 
approximately five minutes. 
 
Please note that failure to attend this appointment will result in this being fed 
back to the Sona administrators. 
 
I look forward to meeting you.  Please remember to bring photo ID to your 
appointment or you may not be able to gain access to the building. 
 
With very best wishes, SWH 
 
General email to be sent following screening: 
 
Dear Xxx, 
 
Thank you very much for expressing interest in participating in our research 
project entitled ‘Craving changes; how do verbal and visuospatial strategies 
modify craving experiences in heavy smokers and drinkers?’ I am emailing to 
confirm that your appointment is (date, time, location).  
 
Just to remind you, a condition of participation is that you will need to abstain 
from smoking for at least eight hours prior to the appointment. This will be 
assessed through administration of a Carbon Monoxide measurement. 
 
Participation will take approximately one hour and you will be paid £10. If you 
consent to be called on two occasions during the following week for two brief 
phone calls you will receive an extra £2.50. Each telephone call will take 
approximately five minutes. 
 
I look forward to meeting you. Please remember to bring photo ID to your 
appointment or you may not be able to gain access to the building. 
 
With very best wishes, SWH 
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Mental Imagery Questionnaire  – All questions refer to your smoking 
image 
 
How vivid was the mental image you were experiencing? 
 
Not at all 
vivid 
  Moderately 
vivid 
  Extremely 
vivid 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How pleasant was the mental image you were experiencing? 
 
Not at all 
pleasant 
  Moderately 
pleasant 
  Extremely 
pleasant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
How much did you NOT want to have the image you were experiencing? 
 
Not at all  
 
  Moderately    Extremely  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
How compelling was the mental image you were experiencing? 
 
Not at all 
compelling 
  Moderately 
compelling 
  Extremely 
compelling 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
How much did you zone-out (i.e. find your mind wandering) during that 
exercise? 
 
 
 
What perspective was your image? 
Sometimes we “see” an image from a first-person perspective. Other times 
we “see” an image from a third-person perspective. In other cases there may 
be a mixture of both. What was the main perspective of your image?  Please 
circle. 
 
 
 
Not at all  
 
  Moderately    Extremely  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Mostly first person (i.e. as if 
through your own eyes) 
 
Mostly third person (from an 
observer’s perspective) 
 
An equal mixture of the 
two 
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Did you notice any verbal thoughts? What were they?  
 
Verbal thought(s): 
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
________ 
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Appendix 8: Booklet/audio recorded instructions for craving regulation 
strategies: Defusion 
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Introduction 
 
Our behaviours are generally motivated by beliefs and thoughts that run 
through our minds like a mental story. These thoughts are activated by 
events or cues in the environment and can sometimes cause unhelpful 
actions. Thoughts can come in the form of words (“verbal thoughts”) like 
“that’s a lovely sunset”.  But they can also come in the form of pictures in 
our mind’s eye (“mental images”) like imagining a lovely sunset. Mental 
images can be in any of our five senses but in this study we will be 
concentrating on visual images. These can be still, like a picture, or 
moving, like a film and they can be very vivid or clear, or they can be 
vague and produce only flashes of a scene. They are often of things that 
have happened, or things that could happen. 
 
It is thought that these mental images can intensify certain feelings, like 
cravings for cigarettes and lead us to do things we would rather not do.  
For example, a person who is keen to stop smoking might experience a 
picture in their mind’s eye of what it would be like to have a cigarette, 
which prompts them to smoke, virtually automatically. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please turn to the next page.
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Do you see this pattern? First, there is the image and then the 
problematic behaviour, because we simply ‘do what we’re told’ by our 
mental images, thoughts and feelings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One way to prevent this automatic pattern is to use a technique called 
cognitive distancing. You will learn more about this technique during this 
session. But first we’d like to know more about your own experiences of 
having mental images, particularly those related to smoking.  
 
Feel free to ask any questions.  Now let the experimenter know you’re 
ready to continue. 
 
You’ll now complete an exercise led by the experimenter. 
Image in our mind 
 
 
Craving for a 
cigarette 
Behaviour 
Smoke a cigarette 
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Strategy explanation 
The last exercise may have shown you how imagery can cause urges to 
smoke.  
As mentioned before, one way to prevent this automatic pattern is to use 
a strategy called cognitive distancing.  Cognitive distancing refers to a 
strategy for deliberately distancing from unhelpful mental images by 
simply noticing them. 
By using cognitive distancing, we can avoid the negative consequences 
of this kind of thinking by focussing mental effort on noticing the images 
as just pictures and allowing ourselves some space from them. In this 
way, we are less likely to become entangled or hooked by our mental 
images, so that we can allow them to come and go of their own accord.  
This is hard to do because we grow used to listening to our thoughts and 
doing what they tell us, especially when they are self-defeating or 
unhelpful. 
For example, having a mental image of a cigarette or cigarette box, or 
seeing a picture in our mind’s eye of ourselves smoking would usually 
make it more likely we smoke a cigarette. This is because we tend to act 
on the automatic thoughts that pop into our minds. By using cognitive 
distancing, we can begin to get some space from our unhelpful mental 
images, and change our relationship to our thoughts by deliberately 
noticing that mental images naturally come and go.  
Please turn to the next page. 
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So if we want to stop smoking but experience a craving, one response is 
to get some distance from our mental images. That way, rather than 
taking a smoking image as a trigger for having a cigarette, you can learn 
that it’s not real, but just a picture your mind is showing you which you 
can get distance from.  The more we can learn to step back from the 
images, the less power they have over us. Then the less automatically we 
will act on them, and we can deliberately decide what we want to do. 
 
Practicing this strategy will help this become easier for you to do, even if 
it is hard at first. 
 
Please let the experimenter know when this recording has ended. 
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Task Instructions 
 
To see how this might work, it is helpful to try the strategy with your 
smoking image.  Please bring this image to mind in as much detail as you 
can. 
 
Now, until you hear the beep that lets you know to stop, I would like you 
to imagine placing your smoking image on a kind of moving fluid or liquid, 
like a flowing river.  You can watch the image float by, moving away from 
you at its own pace.  Allow the image to drift along with the flow. If your 
smoking image or another image comes back, just imagine placing it on 
the moving liquid again.  Watch it move away at its own pace.   
 
You don’t need to get rid of your images.  Just let them float on the liquid 
at their own speed.  
 
If you get distracted, please return to the strategy. 
 
Please let the experimenter know when you have been asked to stop 
on the recording. 
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Appendix 9: Audio recorded instructions: Defusion
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Audio recorded instructions: Defusion 
 
Strategy use: practice 
 
“Now we’d like you to return to your smoking image.  Please really concentrate 
on the image, get caught up in it, bring it to life, as if it’s happening now and 
give it your full attention until you are given further instructions.  Immerse 
yourself in the image, as if you are participating in the scene but do not use the 
strategy you were just taught while you are imagining your smoking image.  
Please start now and continue until you are asked to stop. 
 
[two minutes silence] 
 
Please stop.  Now, if the image or any other smoking related image pops into 
your mind please use the cognitive distancing strategy. Please start now and 
continue until you are asked to stop.  If you become distracted during this time, 
please return to using the strategy. 
 
[two minutes silence] 
 
Please stop.” 
 
 
Main task 
 
“Again, return to your smoking image.  Please really concentrate on the image, 
get caught up, bring it to life, as if it’s happening now and give it your full 
attention until you are given further instructions.  Immerse yourself in the image, 
as if you are participating in the scene but again do not use the strategy you were 
taught. Please start now and continue until you are asked to stop. 
 
[two minutes silence] 
 
Continue to focus on your image, but now if the image or any other smoking 
related image pops into your mind please use the cognitive distancing strategy 
again. Please start now and continue until you are asked to stop.  If you become 
distracted during this time, please return to using the strategy. 
 
[two minutes silence] 
 
Please stop.” 
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Appendix 10: Booklet/audio recorded instructions for craving regulation 
strategies: Alternative Imagery 
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Introduction 
 
Our behaviours are generally motivated by beliefs and thoughts that run 
through our minds like a mental story. These thoughts are activated by 
events or cues in the environment and can sometimes cause unhelpful 
actions. Thoughts can come in the form of words (“verbal thoughts”) like 
“that’s a lovely sunset”.  But they can also come in the form of pictures in 
our mind’s eye (“mental images”) like imagining a lovely sunset. Mental 
images can be in any of our five senses but in this study we will be 
concentrating on visual images. These can be still, like a picture, or 
moving, like a film and they can be very vivid or clear, or they can be 
vague and produce only flashes of a scene. They are often of things that 
have happened, or things that could happen. 
 
It is thought that these mental images can intensify certain feelings, like 
cravings for cigarettes and lead us to do things we would rather not do.  
For example, a person who is keen to stop smoking might experience a 
picture in their mind’s eye of what it would be like to have a cigarette, 
which prompts them to smoke, virtually automatically. 
 
 
 
Please turn to the next page. 
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Do you see this pattern? First, there is the image and then the 
problematic behaviour, because we simply ‘do what we’re told’ by our 
mental images, thoughts and feelings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One way to prevent this automatic pattern is to use a technique called 
cognitive distraction. You will learn more about this technique during this 
session. But first we’d like to know more about your own experiences of 
having mental images, particularly those related to smoking.  
 
Feel free to ask any questions.  Now let the experimenter know you’re 
ready to continue. 
 
You’ll now complete an exercise led by the experimenter.
Craving for a 
cigarette Image in our mind 
 
 
Behaviour 
Smoke a cigarette 
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Strategy explanation 
 
The last exercise may have shown you how imagery can cause urges to 
smoke.  
As mentioned before, one way to prevent this automatic pattern is to use 
a strategy called cognitive distraction. Cognitive distraction refers to a 
strategy for deliberately distracting from unhelpful mental images by 
focusing on an unrelated image.  
By using cognitive distraction, we can avoid the negative consequences 
of this kind of thinking by focussing mental effort on changing the images 
and substituting them for other ones.  In this way, we are less likely to be 
controlled by our mental images so that we can chose to do what we 
want, not what they tell us to do. This is hard to do because we grow 
used to listening to our thoughts and doing what they tell us, especially 
when they are self-defeating or unhelpful. 
For example, having a mental image of a cigarette or cigarette box, or 
seeing a picture in our mind’s eye of ourself smoking would usually make 
it more likely we smoke a cigarette. This is because we tend to act on the 
automatic thoughts that pop into our minds. By using cognitive distraction, 
we can begin to replace our unhelpful mental images and change the 
content of our thoughts by deliberately thinking about some different 
images instead. 
 
Please turn to the next page. 
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So if we want to stop smoking but experience a craving, one response is 
to imagine a different scenario in a lot of detail. That way, rather than 
taking a smoking image as a trigger for having a cigarette, you can use a 
different mental image to try to distract your mind and fill it up with some 
different images instead. The less space the images take up in our minds, 
the less power they have over us. Then the less automatically we will act 
on them, and we can deliberately decide what we want to do. 
 
Practicing this strategy will help this become easier for you to do, even if 
it is hard at first. 
 
Please let the experimenter know when this recording has ended. 
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Task Instructions 
 
To see how this might work, it is helpful to try the strategy with your 
smoking image.  Please bring this image to mind in as much detail as you 
can. 
 
Now, until you hear the beep that lets you know to stop, I would like you 
to replace your smoking image with an image of being beside a river.  
Imagine you can see light brown leaves on the surface of the river.  You 
can see the trees by the bank, and blue sky with a few white clouds.  If 
your smoking image or another image comes back, please replace it with 
this riverside scene. The water is clear and you can see the reflections of 
the clouds in the water.   
 
You need to be able to look around this scene at the different things you 
can see. 
 
If you get distracted, please return to the strategy. 
 
Please let the experimenter know when you have been asked to stop 
on the recording. 
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Appendix 11: Audio recorded instructions: Alternative Imagery 
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Audio recorded instructions: Alternative Imagery 
 
Strategy use: practice 
 
“Now we’d like you to return to your smoking image.  Please really concentrate 
on the image, get caught up in it, bring it to life, as if it’s happening now and 
give it your full attention until you are given further instructions.  Immerse 
yourself in the image, as if you are participating in the scene but do not use the 
strategy you were just taught while you are imagining your smoking image.  
Please start now and continue until you are asked to stop. 
 
[two minutes silence] 
 
Please stop.  Now, if the image or any other smoking related image pops into 
your mind please use the cognitive distraction strategy. Please start now and 
continue until you are asked to stop.  If you become distracted during this time, 
please return to using the strategy. 
 
[two minutes silence] 
 
Please stop.” 
 
Main task 
 
“Again, return to your smoking image.  Please really concentrate on the image, 
get caught up, bring it to life, as if it’s happening now and give it your full 
attention until you are given further instructions.  Immerse yourself in the image, 
as if you are participating in the scene but again do not use the strategy you were 
taught. Please start now and continue until you are asked to stop. 
 
[two minutes silence] 
 
Continue to focus on your image, but now if the image or any other smoking 
related image pops into your mind please use the cognitive distraction strategy 
again. Please start now and continue until you are asked to stop.  If you become 
distracted during this time, please return to using the strategy. 
 
[two minutes silence] 
 
Please stop.” 
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Appendix 12: Booklet/audio recorded instructions for craving regulation 
strategies: Suppression 
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Introduction 
 
Our behaviours are generally motivated by beliefs and thoughts that run 
through our minds like a mental story. These thoughts are activated by 
events or cues in the environment and can sometimes cause unhelpful 
actions. Thoughts can come in the form of words (“verbal thoughts”) like 
“that’s a lovely sunset”.  But they can also come in the form of pictures in 
our mind’s eye (“mental images”) like imagining a lovely sunset. Mental 
images can be in any of our five senses but in this study we will be 
concentrating on visual images. These can be still, like a picture, or 
moving, like a film and they can be very vivid or clear, or they can be 
vague and produce only flashes of a scene. They are often of things that 
have happened, or things that could happen. 
 
It is thought that these mental images can intensify certain feelings, like 
cravings for cigarettes and lead us to do things we would rather not do.  
For example, a person who is keen to stop smoking might experience a 
picture in their mind’s eye of what it would be like to have a cigarette, 
which prompts them to smoke, virtually automatically. 
 
 
Please turn to the next page. 
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Do you see this pattern? First, there is the image and then the 
problematic behaviour, because we simply ‘do what we’re told’ by our 
mental images, thoughts and feelings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One way to prevent this automatic pattern is to use a technique called 
cognitive elimination. You will learn more about this technique during this 
session. But first we’d like to know more about your own experiences of 
having mental images, particularly those related to smoking.  
 
Feel free to ask any questions.  Now let the experimenter know you’re 
ready to continue. 
 
You’ll now complete an exercise led by the experimenter. 
Craving for a 
cigarette Image in our mind 
 
 
Behaviour 
Smoke a cigarette 
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Strategy explanation 
 
The last exercise may have shown you how imagery can cause urges to 
smoke.  
As mentioned before, one way to prevent this automatic pattern is to use 
a strategy called cognitive elimination.  Cognitive elimination refers to a 
strategy for deliberately eliminating unhelpful mental images by “willing 
them away.” 
By using cognitive elimination, we can avoid the negative consequences 
of this kind of thinking by focussing mental effort on ignoring the images 
and pushing them out of our awareness. In this way, we are less likely to 
be controlled by our mental images so that we can chose to do what we 
want, not what they tell us to do. This is hard to do because we grow 
used to listening to our thoughts and doing what they tell us, especially 
when they are self-defeating or unhelpful. 
For example, having a mental image of a cigarette or cigarette box, or 
seeing a picture in our mind’s eye of ourselves smoking would usually 
make it more likely we smoke a cigarette. This is because we tend to act 
on the automatic thoughts that pop into our minds.  By using cognitive 
elimination, we can begin to avoid our unhelpful mental images and 
change the content of our thoughts by deliberately erasing these mental 
images from our mind. 
 
Please turn to the next page. 
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So if we want to stop smoking but experience a craving, one response is 
to erase or push our mental images away. That way, rather than taking a 
smoking image as a trigger for having a cigarette, you can stay in control 
of your mental images by trying to stop yourself thinking about them. The 
more we take control of the images and push them away, the less power 
they have over us. Then the less automatically we will act on them, and 
we can deliberately decide what we want to do. 
 
Practicing this strategy will help this become easier for you to do, even if 
it is hard at first. 
 
Please let the experimenter know when this recording has ended. 
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Task Instructions 
 
To see how this might work, it is helpful to try the strategy with your 
smoking image.  Please bring this image to mind in as much detail as you 
can. 
 
Now, until you hear the beep that lets you know to stop, I would like you 
to push your smoking image out of your mind. Erase the image, really try 
to push it out of your mind and don’t think about it.  If your smoking image 
or another image comes back, make sure you stop thinking about it.  
Concentrate on eliminating the image so that you don’t experience it.  Try 
not to have this image and aim to push the image out of your mind. 
 
You need to be able to get rid of these images, to make sure they are not 
in your mind. 
 
If you get distracted, please return to the strategy. 
 
Please let the experimenter know when you have been asked to stop 
on the recording. 
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Appendix 13: Audio recorded instructions: Suppression 
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Audio recorded instructions: Suppression 
 
Strategy use: practice 
 
“Now we’d like you to return to your smoking image.  Please really concentrate 
on the image, get caught up in it, bring it to life, as if it’s happening now and 
give it your full attention until you are given further instructions.  Immerse 
yourself in the image, as if you are participating in the scene but do not use the 
strategy you were just taught while you are imagining your smoking image.  
Please start now and continue until you are asked to stop. 
 
[two minutes silence] 
 
Please stop.  Now, if the image or any other smoking related image pops into 
your mind please use the cognitive elimination strategy. Please start now and 
continue until you are asked to stop.  If you become distracted during this time, 
please return to using the strategy. 
 
[two minutes silence] 
 
Please stop.”  
 
Main task 
 
“Again, return to your smoking image.  Please really concentrate on the image, 
get caught up, bring it to life, as if it’s happening now and give it your full 
attention until you are given further instructions.  Immerse yourself in the image, 
as if you are participating in the scene but again do not use the strategy you were 
taught. Please start now and continue until you are asked to stop. 
 
[two minutes silence] 
 
Continue to focus on your image, but now if the image or any other smoking 
related image pops into your mind please use the cognitive elimination strategy 
again. Please start now and continue until you are asked to stop.  If you become 
distracted during this time, please return to using the strategy. 
 
[two minutes silence] 
 
Please stop.”  
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Appendix 14: Stimuli used in Stimulus-Response Compatibility task 
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Stimuli for the Stimulus-Response Compatibility task 
 
Stimuli for the Stimulus-Response Compatibility task were the same as those 
used in Mogg, K., Bradley, B. P., Field, M., & De Houwer, J. (2003). Eye 
movements to smoking-related pictures in smokers: Relationship between 
attentional biases and implicit and explicit measures of stimulus valence. 
Addiction, 98(6), 825-836. doi: 10.1046/j.1360-0443.2003.00392.x 
 
These were kindly provided as .BMP electronic files by the corresponding 
author, Professor Mogg, to Dr Tom Freeman, UCL, who programmed the task. 
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Appendix 15: Reminder cue cards 
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Cue card: Defusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cue card: Alternative Imagery 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cue card: Suppression 
 
 
 
 
How to manage your cravings 
 
Imagine placing your smoking image on a 
kind of moving fluid or liquid, like a 
flowing river.  You can watch the image 
float by, moving away from you at its 
own pace.  Allow the image to drift along 
with the flow. Watch it move away at its 
own pace. 
 
 
How to manage your cravings 
 
Replace your smoking image with an 
image of being beside a river.  Imagine 
you can see light brown leaves on the 
surface of the river.  You can see the 
trees by the bank, and blue sky with a 
few white clouds reflected in the water. 
 
How to manage your cravings 
 
Push your smoking image out of your 
mind. Erase the image, really try to 
push it out of your mind and don’t think 
about it. Concentrate on eliminating the 
image so that you don’t experience it.  
Try not to have this image. 
 
